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THE UNEASY CASE FOR PATENT FEDERALISM
∗

ROGER ALLAN FORD

Nationwide uniformity is often considered an essential feature of the
patent system, necessary to fulfill that system’s disclosure and incentive
purposes. In the last few years, however, more than half the states have
enacted laws that seek to disrupt this uniformity by making it harder for
patent holders to enforce their patents. There is an easy case to be made
against giving states greater authority over the patent system: doing so
would threaten to disrupt the system’s balance between innovation
incentives and a robust public domain and would permit rent seeking by
states that disproportionately produce or consume innovation.
There is, nevertheless, an uneasy case that this particular form of
patent federalism may be a good thing. The federal patent system has
systemic flaws that lead to low-quality patents, nuisance patent litigation,
and patent trolls exploiting asymmetric bargaining power. And efforts to
address these flaws have faltered, or have had limited effects, due to publicchoice dynamics in the patent system, so the scope of patent protections has
expanded over time without regard to the system’s purpose of encouraging
innovation.
States may help address some of these problems not in spite of, but
because of, their own flaws. States have their own public-choice dynamics
that happen to offset some of the flaws of the federal system. State antipatent laws have been driven largely by small businesses and local smallbusiness groups, which, unlike most patent holders, have preexisting
influence in state government. And the laws they have crafted using this
influence are well-targeted to affect only the most troublesome patent cases:
nuisance cases, cases asserting low-quality patents, and cases targeting end
users. States pushing back with anti-patent laws, then, may represent an
effective second-best solution to the problem of harmful patent assertions.
Moreover, recognizing the dynamics that led to these laws may provide
helpful insights in designing federal patent reforms.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2012, thousands of small businesses began receiving demand
letters claiming that if the companies used networked document
scanners—scanners that send scanned documents to users via email, or
that upload them to servers—they were committing patent
infringement.1 The letters came at first from a company called Project
Paperless LLC, and later from an alphabet soup of companies with
names like AccNum, LLC; AllLed, LLC; AdzPro, LLC; CalNeb,
LLC; and ChaPac, LLC, all of which turned out to be subsidiaries of

1.
See, e.g., Mike Masnick, Patent Troll Shell Companies Shake Down
Small Businesses for $1k Per Employee for Using Network Scanner, TECHDIRT (Jan. 2,
2013, 1:34 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130102/08174721543/patenttroll-shell-companies-shake-down-small-businesses-1k-per-employee-using-networkscanner.shtml [https://perma.cc/W58C-T2L5]; Joe Mullin, Patent Trolls Want
$1,000—for Using Scanners: An Alphabet Soup of Patent Trolls is Threatening End
Users with Lawsuits, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 2, 2013, 8:30 AM),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/ 01/patent-trolls-want-1000-for-using-scanners/
[https://perma.cc/XM5F-R9KV].
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MPHJ Technology Investments, LLC (MPHJ).2 The letters demanded
$1,000 per employee for infringement of four patents with titles like
“Distributed computer architecture and process for document
management.”3 Notably, even though common scanning systems from
companies like Canon and Xerox offer the allegedly patented features
as standard features, the demands did not go to those companies, or
even to large companies using scanners; they went after 16,465 small
businesses instead.4
As a matter of patent law, the companies that issued these demand
letters probably did nothing wrong.5 They really did own the described
patents, which had been issued by the Patent and Trademark Office.
The patents plausibly appeared to cover the scanning setups described
in the letters; certainly courts have accepted less-plausible-sounding
patent claims. The patents may have been invalid, either because they
did not cover something novel or because the claimed inventions were
obvious at the time they were invented, but under federal law, patents

2.
3.

Mullin, supra note 1.
Several representative letters are available at MPHJ Technologies,
TROLLING
EFFECTS,
https://trollingeffects.org/patent-owner/mphj-technologies
[https://perma.cc/TWY8-EJVR] (last visited Mar. 28, 2017). The patents are: Process
and Architecture for Use on Stand-alone Machine and in Distributed Computer
Architecture for Client Server and/or Intranet and/or Internet Operating Environments,
U.S. Patent No. 6,185,590 (issued Feb. 6, 2001); Distributed Computer Architecture
and Process for Virtual Copying, U.S. Patent No. 6,771,381 (issued Aug. 3, 2004);
Distributed Computer Architecture and Process for Virtual Copying, U.S. Patent No.
7,477,410 (issued Jan. 13, 2009); and Distributed Computer Architecture and Process
for Document Management, U.S. Patent No. 7,986,426 (issued July 26, 2011).
4.
See Alison Griswold, The FTC Has Settled with America’s Most
Notorious
Patent
Troll,
SLATE
(Nov.
7,
2014,
9:21
AM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/
2014/11/07/ftc_patent_troll_settlement_mphj_charged_with_deceptive_sales_claims_an
d.html [https://perma.cc/R3QZ-YJNA]. Since the demand-letter campaign began, three
makers of network scanners have obtained inter partes review by the Patent and
Trademark Office of two MPHJ patents. See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. MPHJ Tech.
Invs., No. IPR2013-00309, at 2, 47 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 19, 2014) (finding 14 of 15 claims
of U.S. Pat. No. 6,771,381 invalid); Ricoh Ams. Corp. v. MPHJ Tech. Invs., No.
IPR2013-00302, at 2, 50–51 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 19, 2014) (finding 10 of 11 claims of
U.S. Pat. No. 7,986,426 invalid).
5.
MPHJ did run into trouble with the Federal Trade Commission, though,
which brought an enforcement action claiming that the demand letters were deceptive.
See FTC Settlement Bars Patent Assertion Entity From Using Deceptive Tactics, FED.
TRADE COMM’N (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/
11/ftc-settlement-bars-patent-assertion-entity-using-deceptive [https://perma.cc/D5JHUZ44]. The claims were brought pursuant to Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). Complaint at 9, In re MPHJ Tech. Invs., No. 142
3003
(F.T.C.
2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/
141106mphjcmpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/J83W-TMB4].
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are presumed valid until someone can prove otherwise.6 And although
going after end users can be more expensive than going after companies
that sell infringing systems, it is not improper, since infringement
includes making, using, selling, offering for sale, or importing a
patented product or process.7
And yet, the letters went viral to a degree that most stories about
the patent system have not. One recipient started a public campaign
against the patent holder, tracking down other recipients and fighting
back when the patent holder sued.8 Other recipients went separately to
the press.9 And members of Congress have pointed to the demand
letters as a sign that Congress should enact patent reform.10
The most unusual response came from the States. Although patent
law is a matter of federal law, several state attorneys general got
involved, targeting the companies under state consumer-protection
laws.11 And state legislatures began passing laws that make it more
difficult to enforce patent rights. Vermont enacted the first such law in
2013;12 the law bans “bad faith assertion[s] of patent infringement”13
6.
See 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012) (“A patent shall be presumed valid. . . .
The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the
party asserting such invalidity.”); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 564 U.S. 91, 91 (2011)
(holding that invalidity must be proved by clear and convincing evidence).
7.
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (defining direct patent infringement). For
a discussion on patent litigation against end users, see Gaia Bernstein, The Rise of the
End User in Patent Litigation, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1443 (2014) (arguing that the patent
system should give end users greater tools to assert their legal interests).
8.
Project Paperless promptly dropped the case. See Mullin, supra note 1.
9.
See, e.g., Paul Muschick, Feds Crack Down on Patent Trolling,
MORNING CALL (Dec. 27, 2014, 6:42 PM), http://mcall.com/news/local/mc-patenttrolls-mphj-watchdog-20141227-column.html [https://perma.cc/Z7GT-4Y3W].
10.
See Joe Mullin, Troll Hunter: Meet the Oregon Lawmaker Who May Fix
the Patent Mess: Rep. Peter DeFazio Took on the Issue After a Local Software
Company Got Held Up, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 28, 2013, 7:00 AM),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/02/troll-hunter-meet-the-oregon-lawmakerwho-may-fix-the-patent-mess/ [https://perma.cc/7PTH-V4VK].
11.
See Joe Mullin, Patent Troll that Wants $1,000 per Worker Gets Sued by
Vermont A-G: Small State’s Action is the First Government Lawsuit Against a Patent
Troll, ARS TECHNICA (May 22, 2013, 1:40 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/
2013/05/patent-troll-that-wants-1000-per-worker-gets-sued-by-vermont-a-g/
[https://perma.cc/68VZ-L8PX]; Joe Mullin, “Scanner Trolls” Kicked Out of
Minnesota: Patent Troll Demanding $1,000 per Worker for Scanner Patents is in Slow
Retreat, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 21, 2013, 7:15 PM), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2013/08/
scanner-trolls-kicked-out-of-minnesota/
[https://perma.cc/CVZ5DGNU]; Joe Mullin, Second State Cracks Down on Patent-Wielding “Scanner Trolls”:
Trolls Must Back Off Their Plan to Get “Fast Money” from Nebraskans, Says AG, ARS
TECHNICA
(July
23,
2013,
3:15
PM),
http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2013/07/second-state-cracks-down-on-patent-wielding-scanner-trolls/
[https://perma.cc/93XS-AYRL].
12.
See generally VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4195–4199 (2016).
13.
§ 4197(a).
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and gives recipients of demand letters the right to bring claims against
the senders.14 The law does not define bad-faith patent assertions,
though it provides courts with a list of eight nonexclusive factors courts
can consider.15 Other states have followed: Between 2013 and August
2016, thirty-one states have enacted laws seeking to reform patent
litigation, mostly modeled on the Vermont legislation.16
These laws are the most prominent recent example of patent
federalism—efforts by the states to adopt their own patent policies.
Although these examples involve anti-patent laws, patent federalism can
take many forms, including laws designed to strengthen federal patent
rights; laws designed to provide state complements or substitutes for
federal patent rights, like state patent rights or trade-secret protections;
and laws designed to provide non-patent innovation incentives, like tax
credits or innovation prizes.
There is an easy case to be made against giving states more
influence over the patent system. For the patent system to work well,
the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, uniform nationwide
rules are key.17 Otherwise, individual states could upset the balance
between encouraging innovation and protecting competition and a
robust public domain.18 State laws that specifically target patent-holders
and make it harder to exercise their patent rights are especially likely to
upset this balance, since they directly undermine the incentives that
patent law is designed to promote. State laws are also troublesome
because they can represent an attempt by residents of that state to

14.
§ 4199(b).
15.
§ 4197(b). The factors include, for instance, whether a demand letter
includes “factual allegations concerning the specific areas in which the target’s
products, services, and technology infringe the patent or are covered by the claims in
the patent,” § 4197(b)(1)(C); whether the sender has conducted “an analysis comparing
the claims in the patent to the target’s products, services, and technology,” §
4197(b)(2); and whether “[t]he demand letter demands payment of a license fee or
response within an unreasonably short period of time,” § 4197(b)(4).
16.
See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
17.
See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,
162 (1989) (“One of the fundamental purposes behind the Patent and Copyright Clauses
of the Constitution was to promote national uniformity in the realm of intellectual
property. . . . This purpose is frustrated by the Florida scheme, which renders the
status of the design and utilitarian ‘ideas’ embodied in the boat hulls it protects [at issue
in the case] uncertain.”). But see Camilla A. Hrdy, State Patents as a Solution to
Underinvestment in Innovation, 62 KAN. L. REV. 487, 488–89, 496–500 (2013); Lisa
Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65, 85–87 (2015).
18.
See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 152 (“The tension between the
desire to freely exploit the full potential of our inventive resources and the need to
create an incentive to deploy those resources is constant. Where it is clear how the
patent laws strike that balance in a particular circumstance, that is not a judgment the
States may second-guess.”).
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extract rents from outsiders, whether by strengthening or weakening
patent rights.
Still, there are reasons to think that this particular form of patent
federalism may have benefits. The federal patent system has wellrecognized problems with low-quality patents and abusive assertions of
patent rights that, in many cases, give patent holders the power to
extract unearned rents. One result of these flaws is the rise of
companies like MPHJ—the worst sorts of patent trolls—that contribute
nothing to society other than nuisance lawsuits. State lawmakers are
well suited to counteract some of these problems because, although
states have their own problems, those problems tend to offset the flaws
in the federal patent system. The parties that benefit from state antipatent laws are disproportionately the ones that are harmed by flaws in
the patent system, while the parties that are harmed by state anti-patent
laws are disproportionately the ones who benefit from flaws in the
patent system. Patent trolls benefit from flaws in the patent system,
while small businesses and customers are harmed by them; state antipatent laws have precisely the opposite effect. So, to the extent that the
flaws in the federal system are real and cannot be fixed, state laws
could help instead.
To be sure, there are strong reasons to be wary of state lawmakers
interfering in the patent system. If the particular mix of citizens in a
given state would happen to benefit from stronger or weaker patent
rights, that state’s lawmakers might enact laws designed to strengthen
or weaken patent rights regardless of any havoc those laws would
wreak on the nationwide patent system. Indeed, this sort of rent seeking
by local interests seems inevitable when states start messing around in a
national system. So state anti-patent laws may be less an affirmative
good and more a least-bad way to reduce the effects of flaws in the
patent system.
But there are reasons to think the dangers of unleashing state
lawmakers on the patent system might be less acute than they might
seem to be. Though these laws could result in small businesses
extracting some value that would otherwise flow to patent holders, they
should have a minimal effect on the behavior of those businesses. Small
businesses are unlikely to locate in specific states in response to these
laws, since patent policy is far from the most salient consideration for
the vast majority of small businesses. And patent holders have no real
choice; a patent holder that wants to assert its patent against a defendant
has no control over where that defendant is located. So these laws are
unlikely to lead to a race to the bottom; their consequences would likely
be limited to deterring the sorts of patent assertions that are
troublesome in the first place.
This Article has five parts. Part I surveys the rise of state antipatent laws and the broader context of federalist conceptions of the
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patent system. Part II makes the easy normative case against patent
federalism. Parts III and IV make the uneasy case for a limited patent
federalism. Part III makes the substantive case, reviewing common
critiques of the federal patent system and discussing how state laws can
counteract the flaws highlighted by those critiques. Part IV makes the
institutional case, explaining how the public-choice economics of the
federal and state systems lead to the problems discussed in Part III. The
upshot is that even though state laws are an especially inelegant way to
target patent-holders, they may nevertheless be an effective second-best
remedy for harmful patent assertions. Part V discusses implications for
the greater patent system and the debate over patent reform.
I.

PATENT FEDERALISM

Patent law is usually considered the province of the federal
government. Although the colonies routinely granted patent-like rights
before the Constitution was ratified, and a few states continued to do so
into the early years of the United States, the last state patent was
granted in 1798.19 This federal primacy is usually justified on
uniformity grounds: only a single nationwide system can correctly
balance society’s dual interests in promoting both innovation and
competition, while minimizing compliance costs.20 Allow states to
interfere, the theory goes, and the system tilts too far in favor of patent
holders or competitors or becomes too costly.
A necessary premise of this argument is that federal law strikes the
right balance between these interests, such that state interference would
be socially costly. Yet there are many reasons to think that is not the
case; instead, complaints about the patent system have been common
for years. The patent office grants too many patents to people who
never really invented anything; patent lawsuits cost millions of dollars
and take years to decide, allowing patent holders to hold up defendants
for nuisance settlements; patent trolls who make nothing target
defendants who make real products, raising the cost of those products;
and so forth.21 And in response to these problems, scholars, patent

19.
See generally Camilla A. Hrdy, State Patent Laws in the Age of Laissez
Faire, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 47–80 (2013).
20.
See infra Part II.
21.
Citations to scholars criticizing aspects of the patent system could fill
several volumes, even setting aside criticism by policymakers and others. For just a
very small sampling of this criticism, see JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER,
PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT
RISK (2008); MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL
MONOPOLY (2010); DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW
THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND
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lawyers, and policymakers have proposed numerous reforms, mostly
designed to make it harder to obtain and enforce patent rights. Some of
these reforms have become law, or are likely to become law soon.22
Given these issues in the federal patent system, it is not surprising
that states have also gotten into the act. This Part first describes the
widespread recent adoption of state anti-patent laws and then considers
whether federal patent law preempts these state laws.23
A. The Rise of State Anti-Patent Laws
Until recently, state policymakers played a limited role in the
patent system. State attorneys general have occasionally targeted patent
owners under state competition or consumer-protection laws,24 but
otherwise, states have mostly stayed out of patent disputes. That
changed in 2013, when states started enacting anti-patent laws. Since
then, thirty-one states have enacted anti-patent legislation, with another
eleven considering bills.25
ITS

DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM

IS

ENDANGERING INNOVATION

AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004).

22.
The America Invents Act contained some measures designed to prevent
abuses of the patent system, most notably including expanded post-grant opposition
procedures and procedures for third parties to submit information for consideration by
the Patent Office. See Leahy–Smith America Invents Act § 6 (2011) (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–329 (2015)) (inter partes and post-grant review); § 8
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2015)) (information submissions by third
parties); § 18 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 321 (2015)) (review of covered
business-method patents). The proposed Innovation Act, which passed the House of
Representatives in 2013, would go further, requiring plaintiffs to include specific
technical details in infringement allegations and imposing fee shifting in patent cases.
Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. (2015–16). And there are signs Congress may
soon consider a venue-reform provision in lieu of more comprehensive reform. See,
e.g., Dennis Crouch, Law Professors Call for Patent Venue Reform, PATENTLYO (July
13,
2016),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/07/professors-patent-reform.html
[https://perma.cc/D26V-QYQ8].
23.
This Article focuses on state efforts to change the substance of the patent
system, through both substantive and procedural rules, but states could also try to insert
themselves into the patent system by hearing patent cases in state courts. See, e.g., Paul
R. Gugliuzza, Patent Law Federalism, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 11.
24.
See, e.g., supra note 11.
25.
Patent Progress’s Guide to State Patent Legislation, PATENT PROGRESS
(last updated Feb. 2, 2017), http://www.patentprogress.org/patent-progress-legislationguides/patent-progresss-guide-state-patent-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/QTD4-VCW4].
The enacted laws are ALA. CODE §§ 8-12A-1 to 8-12A-7 (2015); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 44-1421 to 44-1424 (2016); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-12-101 to 6-12-104
(2015); FLA. STAT. §§ 501.991 to 501.997 (2016); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-770 to 101-774 (2015); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 48-1701 to 48-1708 (2015); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT.
505/2SSS (2015); IND. CODE §§ 24-11-1-1 to 24-11-5-2 (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 506,140 (2015); LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:1428 (2015); ME. STAT. tit. 14, §§ 8701–8702
(2015); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 11-1601 to 11-1605 (2015); H.B. 589, 113th
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The state laws take three basic forms. The most common pattern is
to ban “bad-faith” assertions of patent rights. For instance, Vermont’s
law, the model for several of the laws, provides that “[a] person shall
not make a bad faith assertion of patent infringement.”26 The law does
not define bad-faith patent assertions, but it lists fourteen factors that
courts may consider in deciding whether a defendant has made such a
bad-faith assertion.27 The listed factors largely go to conduct outside of
the courtroom. One factor, for instance, looks to whether the patent
holder sent a demand letter that did not contain information like the
patent number, the patent owner’s name and address, and specific
infringement allegations.28 Another looks to whether the patent holder
actually performed an infringement analysis before sending the letter.29
Others go to the merits of the patent case, including whether the patent
holder offered to license the patent for an unreasonable amount or
whether the patent holder knew or should have known that the claim
was meritless.30 And some factors go to the patent holder’s status: it
weighs against a bad-faith finding when the patent holder is the original
inventor or assignee, is an educational institution, or has made
investments in its own products practicing the patented technology.31
The law also provides for enforcement by the state attorney general,32
or, in a private cause of action, by a target of a bad-faith patent
assertion.33 Although this description is specific to Vermont law, most
of the other state statutes have borrowed the basic approach.
The second model for state laws is to ban false threats to bring a
patent lawsuit. For instance, the Illinois statute makes it illegal to send
a communication asserting that the recipient infringes a patent if that
communication “falsely threatens that administrative or judicial relief
Legis. Sess. (Miss. 2015) (not yet codified); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 416.650 to 416.658
(2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-13-152 (2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 359-M:1 to
359-M:5 (2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-140 to 75-145 (2015); N.D. CENT. CODE §§
51-36-01 to 51-36-08 (2015); OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, §§ 111–14 (2015); S.B. 1540, 77th
Legis. Assemb. (Or. 2014) (to be codified as amended in OR. REV. STAT. § 646.608); 6
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 6-41.1-1 to 6-41.1-6 (2016); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-4-100 to 394-150 (2016); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 37-36-1 to 37-36-9 (2015); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 29-10-101 to 29-10-104 (2015); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.952 (West
2015); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-6-1901 to 78B-6-1905 (West 2015); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4195–4199 (2016); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-215.1 to 59.1-215.4
(2015); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.350.005 to 19.350.900 (2015); WIS. STAT. § 100.197
(2015–16); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-1-201 to 40-1-205 (2016).
26.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4197(a) (2016).
27.
§ 4197(b)–(c).
28.
§ 4197(b)(1).
29.
§ 4197(b)(2).
30.
§ 4197(b)(5)–(6).
31.
§ 4197(c)(4)–(5).
32.
§ 4199(a).
33.
§ 4199(b).
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will be sought if compensation is not paid or the infringement issue is
not otherwise resolved.”34 This bans a technique used by MPHJ:
sending demand letters that asserted that, if the recipient did not agree
to a license within two weeks, a lawsuit would be filed. In most cases,
no lawsuit came.
The third model is to require demand letters to include specific
information. For instance, the Illinois statute requires demand letters
“inform an intended recipient or any affiliated person about the patent
assertion” by including several specific pieces of information, like the
sender’s identity, the patent number, and factual allegations explaining
how the recipient allegedly infringes the patent.35 Similarly, the
Wisconsin statute requires that demand letters contain several specific
types of information, including the number of each asserted patent and
specific asserted claims, a copy of each patent, an explanation of the
sender’s infringement theory, and a list of every pending or completed
court case or administrative proceeding concerning each asserted
patent.36
These provisions all follow the same basic strategy of regulating
patent holders’ out-of-court behavior, in the form of demand letters and
threats to bring infringement suits. The laws take this form for a few
reasons. One reason is almost certainly to insulate the state laws, to
whatever degree possible, from being preempted by federal patent
law.37 But demand letters and litigation threats also give rise to
substantive concerns that were particularly troubling to state
lawmakers. As the Vermont attorney general testified, abusive demand
letters can impose significant costs even when they represent empty
threats.38 Because many, perhaps most, letters are never followed by
litigation, they can be sent at essentially zero marginal cost. The cost of
defending a patent lawsuit, however, can be millions of dollars even for
a relatively low-stakes case. So there is little downside to sending many
letters, even when the merits of the infringement claim would be weak;
the asymmetric stakes and limited legal knowledge of many recipients
create strong incentives to pay up. And because demand letters are not
public documents, it can be hard to detect new letter-writing campaigns
or campaigns relying on false or misleading statements. Finally, though
federal courts and lawmakers have made progress toward reform in
34.
815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2SSS(b)(1) (2015).
35.
505/2SSS(b)(4).
36.
WIS. STAT. § 100.197(2)(a) (2015–16)
37.
See infra Part I.A.
38.
Trolling for a Solution: Ending Abusive Patent Demand Letters: Hearing
Before the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg., &
Trade, 113th Cong. (Apr. 8, 2014) (statement of William H. Sorrell, Att’y Gen. of
Vt.),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg90884/html/CHRG113hhrg90884.htm [https://perma.cc/QPM9-292C].
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many areas of patent practice,39 they have not taken on abusive demand
letters, leaving room for a state role.
Given these facts, it is unsurprising that states became involved.
And yet, in the short time they have been in force, these laws have had
little practical effect. Few cases have been brought under them.40 And
though it is possible that they deterred patent holders from enforcing
patent claims against residents of the enacting states, these laws have
not led to any significant decline in patent litigation brought in those
states.41 Still, it may be too early to see results; if the laws ever have
the effects they were designed to have, it is worth considering whether
those effects are desirable.
B. State Anti-Patent Laws and Federal Preemption
Patent law is usually thought of as an exclusive creature of federal
law.42 Patent law gets its own title (Title 35) of the United States Code,
and federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases arising
under federal patent law.43 Moreover, as discussed below, the Supreme
Court has held that states are prohibited from creating their own patentlike rights because they would upset the balance struck by federal
patent law. So there is a strong argument that anti-patent laws are
preempted: although they create no new patent-like rights, they would
interfere with this balance in the opposite direction, undermining the
innovation incentives created by patent law. But the argument is not airtight; notably, the Supreme Court’s patent-preemption case law almost
39.
For citations on legislative reforms, see supra note 22. Judicially, the
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have decided numerous cases since 2005 in
ways that narrow patent scope, make it harder to bring abusive patent claims, or
otherwise tighten patent standards. See, e.g., Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v.
Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015); Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347
(2014); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550
U.S. 398 (2007); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); Phillips v.
AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); see also Mark A. Lemley, The
Surprising Resilience of the Patent System, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2016).
40.
The State of Vermont sued MPHJ under that state’s law, and a North
Carolina company asserted a counterclaim under that state’s law after getting sued for
patent infringement. See Vermont v. MPHJ Tech. Invs., No. 282-5-13 Wncv, 2014 WL
5795264 at *4 (Vt. Super. Aug. 28, 2014) (denying MPHJ’s motion to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction); Complaint, Cirrex Systems, LLC v. Sumitomo Electric
Lightwave Corp., No. 120140924211523, 2014 WL 4999353 (D. Del. Sept. 24, 2014);
Jason D. Gardner & Stephen J. E. Dew, North Carolina Abusive Patent Assertions Act:
A Powerful Gun, but Will It Hold Up in a Gunfight?, 17 N.C.J.L. & TECH. 391, 416
(2016).
41.
See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 39.
42.
E.g., Hrdy, supra note 19, at 47 (“Today patent law is purely a federal
creature.”).
43.
28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012).
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exclusively addresses laws granting rights on top of those granted by
the patent system, not ones cutting back on federal patent rights.44
Federal patent law preempts many state efforts to interfere with the
patent system because those efforts undermine the goals of the federal
scheme.45 As the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, the patent
system represents a compromise between competing goals. Patents
solve a market failure: because it often costs much more to innovate
and develop a new invention than it costs to copy that invention once it
exists, society will under-invest in inventions absent some outside
incentive to make those investments.46 Patents provide that incentive by
giving an inventor a period of exclusivity, so she can charge monopoly
prices and recover that initial investment. But this exclusivity imposes a
cost: monopolists charge monopoly prices, so fewer consumers can
afford to purchase the seller’s good.47 So when a patented drug costs
44.
Commentators have reached different conclusions on the likelihood that
the state laws, or the Vermont law that launched the trend, would survive preemption
analysis. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Trolls and Preemption, 101 VA. L. REV. 1579,
1631–35 (2015) (concluding that the Federal Circuit’s preemption case law “gives
courts a clear path to find some of the new state statutes invalid and to limit the
application of others”); David Lee Johnson, Note, Facing Down the Trolls: States
Stumble on the Bridge to Patent-Assertion Regulation, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2023,
2028 (2014) (concluding that “much of [Vermont’s] law is likely dead letter because it
is preempted by federal patent law”); T. Christian Landreth, The Fight Against “Patent
Trolls:” Will State Law Come to the Rescue?, 15 N.C.J.L. & TECH. ON. 100 (2014)
(concluding that “Vermont has avoided preemption by tailoring its efforts to conform to
federal guidelines”); Camilla A. Hrdy, The Reemergence of State Regulation of
Patents, 89 Colo. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017) (concluding that under Allen v. Riley,
203 U.S. 347 (1906), states retain substantial power to regulate the assertion of federal
patent rights).
45.
This form of preemption arises when the state and federal law conflict,
directly or indirectly. See generally Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67–74 (1941)
(asking whether a state immigration law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress”); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 5.2 at 392–418 (4th ed. 2011);
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-28 at 1172–79 (3d ed.
2000). Two other forms of preemption do not apply in patent law: express preemption,
which applies when a statute contains an express preemption clause, and field
preemption, which applies when Congress has enacted a comprehensive regulatory
scheme designed to occupy fully a particular field, leaving no room for state laws. See
generally Gugliuzza, supra note 44, at 1601–08.
46.
This is the standard utilitarian case for patent rights, and it is embodied in
the Constitution itself. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have
Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries”); Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 71, 77 n.18 (2013) (reviewing various economic explanations for the
benefits of patent law).
47.
This reduced output is the standard explanation of the social cost of
monopolies. See, e.g., Edwin G. West, Monopoly, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY
OF ECONOMICS (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008).
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$440,000 for a year’s supply for one patient, that allows the inventor
time to recover some of its development costs, but it also means that
fewer patients can benefit from the invention.48 As a consequence, then,
the patent monopoly must be carefully balanced; too strong a
monopoly, and the social costs of the patent system outweigh its
benefits. And uniform federal standards promote this balance: as the
Supreme Court has explained, “the patent system is one in which
uniform federal standards are carefully used to promote invention while
at the same time preserving free competition.”49
State laws can upend this balance in either direction. State laws
that try to narrow exclusive rights, compared with the rights created by
the federal patent system, reduce the innovation incentives by reducing
the benefits created by the patent system. State consumer-protection
laws that erect barriers to bringing patent claims, for instance, make it
harder for patent holders to assert legitimate patent rights, reducing the
value of those rights and, thus, reducing the ex ante incentive to invest
in new inventions. On the other hand, state laws that try to expand
exclusive rights beyond the limits of patent law impinge on the public’s
right to use ideas from the public domain. But a robust public domain is
one of the goals of the patent system, not some sort of loophole that
must be closed, so these laws equally upset the patent system’s balance.
This latter concern about narrowing the public domain has been
key in several Supreme Court cases on the preemptive effect of patent
law. For instance, in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., the Court
held that a state unfair-competition law could not be used against a
company that sold knock-offs of a competitor’s lamp design, when the
original lamp was unprotected by patent law.50 The Court explained that
the patent system exists to solve an economic problem: “Patents are not
given as favors, . . . but are meant to encourage invention by
rewarding the inventor with the right, limited to a term of years fixed
by the patent, to exclude others from the use of his invention.”51 But
once that exclusivity has expired, the public’s interest takes over: “[I]n
rewarding useful invention, the rights and welfare of the community
must be fairly dealt with and effectually guarded. To that end the
prerequisites to obtaining a patent are strictly observed, and when the
patent has issued the limitations on its exercise are equally strictly
48.
See Matthew Herper, How a $440,000 Drug is Turning Alexion Into
Biotech’s New Innovation Powerhouse, FORBES (Sept. 24, 2012), https://www.
forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2012/09/05/how-a-440000-drug-is-turning-alexioninto-biotechs-new-innovation-powerhouse/#4d7b1af525e1
[https://perma.cc/manage/create].
49.
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230–31 (1964).
50.
Id. at 232–33; see also Compco Corp. v. Day–Brite Lighting, Inc., 376
U.S. 234, 238 (1964) (companion case).
51.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 376 U.S. at 229.
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enforced.”52 And since the patent laws exist to promote both new
innovations and a robust public domain, states cannot interfere with the
balance Congress has struck between these competing objectives. This
is true regardless of the specific means employed: “Just as a State
cannot encroach upon the federal patent laws directly, it cannot, under
some other law, such as that forbidding unfair competition, give
protection of a kind that clashes with the objectives of the federal patent
laws.”53
Twenty-five years later, the Court expressed many of the same
concerns in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.54 In that
case, the Court struck down a state law making it illegal to use specific
techniques to copy the design of a boat hull, or to knowingly sell a boat
made using those techniques.55 The Court observed that patent law
“embodied a careful balance between the need to promote innovation
and the recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation are
both necessary to invention itself and the very lifeblood of a
competitive economy.”56 And the Court emphasized that both sides of
the equation were equally important: while intellectual property
provides important incentives to create new things, at the same time
“the efficient operation of the federal patent system depends upon
substantially free trade in publicly known, unpatented design and
utilitarian conceptions.”57 State laws that interfered with this robust
public domain would be just as great an obstacle to the objectives of
patent law as would laws that interfered with patent rights in the first
place.58
The laws at issue in Sears, Roebuck & Co. and Bonito Boats
created exclusivities that did not exist under federal law; the Court has
not dealt with state laws seeking to interfere with exclusivities that are
created by federal law. But it is likely that the Court’s reasoning would
apply to those laws as well. If patent law is a careful balance between
competing interests in encouraging innovation and encouraging a robust
public domain, then state laws that diminish the precise tool federal law
uses to encourage innovation—the grant of patent rights—are just as

52.
Id. at 230 (quotations and citations omitted).
53.
Id. at 231.
54.
489 U.S. 141, 167 (1989).
55.
Id. at 143–44.
56.
Id. at 146.
57.
Id. at 156.
58.
See id. at 156–57 (“A state law that substantially interferes with the
enjoyment of an unpatented utilitarian or design conception which has been freely
disclosed by its author to the public at large impermissibly contravenes the ultimate
goal of public disclosure and use which is the centerpiece of federal patent policy.”).
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harmful to that balance as laws that narrow the public domain.59 That
alone may be enough to find the state anti-patent laws preempted by
federal law. But they also interfere with federal patent in another way:
by reducing the nationwide uniformity of that law. The Court has been
especially concerned about laws that threaten uniformity, since the
“inherently ephemeral nature of property in ideas [and the] great power
such property has to cause harm to the competitive policies which
underlay the federal patent laws” create a risk of rent seeking by locally
important industries.60
The best hope for upholding state anti-patent laws likely lies in the
Supreme Court’s decision in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,61 which
upheld state trade-secrecy laws against a preemption challenge.62 Tradesecrecy laws extend limited protections to trade secrets—information
that derives economic value from its secrecy. Trade-secrecy laws
potentially conflict with federal patent law because inventors can often
choose whether to protect their inventions with patents, disclosing them
to the world in exchange for limited exclusivities, or by choosing not to
disclose and instead protecting them as trade secrets.63 The Court
upheld the statutes. It reasoned, in part, that trade-secrecy law largely
serves different purposes than patent law, working to encourage
standards of commercial ethics and encouraging innovation, rather than
encouraging the disclosure of new inventions to the public.64 But the
most significant piece of the opinion analyzed the effect of trade-

59.
But see Paul Heald, Federal Intellectual Property Law and the Economics
of Preemption, 76 IOWA L. REV. 959, 969 (1991) (“Preemption occurs when analysis of
protection criteria reveals a direct conflict between state and federal patent law. The
decisions, however, do not authorize courts to strike down state laws simply because
they do not provide for optimally efficient results. . . . A state law which upsets the
balance as actually struck by a federal statute (inefficient though it may be) cannot be
immunized from attack by a court which purports to find it ‘efficient.’”) (footnotes
omitted).
60.
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162–63
(1989) (citing Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 179 (1978)).
61.
416 U.S. 470 (1974).
62.
Id. at 493.
63.
Since Kewanee Oil, both the federal government and nearly all states
have adopted trade-secrecy laws. See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No.
114-153, 130 Stat. 376; Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1.4 (1985) (defining “trade
secret”); §§ 2–3 (providing for injunctive relief and damages when someone
misappropriates a trade secret).
64.
This reasoning has been much criticized. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk,
Protection of Trade Secrets in Outer Space Activity: A Study in Federal Preemption, 23
SETON HALL L. REV. 560, 623–26 (1993); Sharon K. Sandeen, Kewanee Revisited:
Returning to First Principles of Intellectual Property Law to Determine the Issue of
Federal Preemption, 12 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 299, 312–13, 322 (2008);
Andrew A. Schwartz, The Corporate Preference for Trade Secret, 74 OHIO ST. L.J.
623, 636 (2013). But see Heald, supra note 59, at 974–82.
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secrecy laws on those incentives to disclose inventions. The Court
concluded that the effect was limited, since most trade secrets are either
clearly not patentable inventions, in which case there is no tradeoff, or
are of dubious patentability, in which case trade secrecy might actually
help weed out invalid patents.65 The Court acknowledged that clearly
patentable inventions present the greatest problem for trade-secrecy law
since in those cases the tradeoff between patents and trade secrets is
most likely to affect inventors’ behavior. The Court concluded, though,
that because a patent provides a much greater reward than a trade
secret, the effect on the incentives set up by the patent system would be
minimal.66
The Court’s reasoning can be criticized for relying on empirical
assumptions without sufficient supporting data,67 but if its assumptions
are correct, then state anti-patent laws might be safe. Those laws
reduce the upside from patent protection, just like trade-secrecy laws
do, but they do not upset the fundamental bargain underlying the patent
system: an inventor who obtains a patent still gets a limited term of
exclusivity in exchange for inventing something new and disclosing that
invention to the world. Nor do they create new exclusivities rights or
deprive the public of any public-domain knowledge, like the laws at
issue in Sears and Bonito Boats. Instead, they tweak the costs of
asserting patent rights, just like state unfair-competition laws or
changes in civil procedure.
The Supreme Court’s case law, then, can be read to suggest that
state anti-patent laws either are or are not preempted by federal patent
law. The Federal Circuit has taken a slightly different approach to
resolving patent-law preemption issues, one under which the laws are
more clearly in trouble. In a series of cases involving state tortiousinterference and unfair-competition laws, the Federal Circuit has held
that state laws survive if and only if they require bad faith on the part
of the patent holder.68 So, for instance, in Zenith Electronics Corp. v.

65.
Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 484–89.
66.
Id. at 489–91.
67.
Alternatively, perhaps the Court properly found that the state laws’
challengers failed to meet their burden to show that federal patent law was undermined.
E.g., Heald, supra note 59, at 981.
68.
See, e.g., Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340, 1355 (Fed.
Cir. 1999); Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1322,
1336–37 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Dow Chem. Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470, 1476–77
(Fed. Cir. 1998). In an extensive analysis of the Federal Circuit’s cases, Paul
Gugliuzza concluded that the Federal Circuit’s rule is better considered an extension of
Noerr-Pennington antitrust immunity than as a traditional preemption test. See
Gugliuzza, supra note 44, at 1616–28; see also United Mine Workers of Am. v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); E.R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
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Exzec, Inc.,69 Exzec brought a counterclaim alleging that Zenith had
falsely informed potential Exzec customers that its product infringed
Zenith’s patents, so that the potential customers would purchase from
Zenith instead.70 Under the Federal Circuit rule, this counterclaim
could only survive if Exzec proved that Zenith’s assertions about its
patents were made in bad faith, because under federal patent law,
patent holders have a right to enforce their patent rights unless they
have no good-faith reason to think those assertions could have merit.71
At first glance, Vermont’s law and the state laws modeled on it
look well designed to fit within this case law, since they purport to
prohibit only patent assertions made in “bad faith.”72 The “bad faith” of
the Federal Circuit’s preemption test, however, bears little resemblance
to the “bad faith” of Vermont’s law. Under the Federal Circuit’s test,
for a state-law tort to apply when a patent holder seeks to enforce her
patent, the patent holder must engage in subjective bad faith and the
underlying patent claim must be objectively baseless.73 No amount of
bad behavior by a patent holder is, by itself, enough to qualify as unfair
competition or tortious interference or any other state-law tort, so long
as there is some reasonable basis for the patent claim. The Vermont
law’s conception of bad faith is not so limited. Most of the factors that
determine good faith have little to do with classic conceptions of bad
faith, subjective or objective; instead, most go to whether the patent
holder has provided the enforcement target with sufficient time and
information to provide a reasonable response.74 A court might construe
the law to require subjective and objective bad faith; indeed, the
Federal Circuit’s cases suggest that this is required. But on the whole,
the Vermont factors are directed to the problem Vermont was trying to
solve—patent enforcement against small businesses and other vulnerable
targets—rather than the problem bad-faith patent enforcement.
Two major conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. First,
since federal courts have almost uniformly struck down state laws
seeking to expand patent protections, and since laws seeking to limit
them are subject to many of the same attacks, there are strong
arguments that state efforts to set patent policy are likely to be

69.
182 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
70.
Id. at 1343.
71.
See Dow Chem., 139 F.3d at 1476.
72.
E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4197(a) (2016) (“A person shall not make
a bad faith assertion of patent infringement.”). Of course, not all the state anti-patent
laws even purport to require bad faith. See, e.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2SSS(b)(1)
(2015); WIS. STAT. § 100.197 (2015–16).
73.
Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Comput. Grp., 362 F.3d 1367, 1374–
77 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
74.
See tit. 9, § 4197.
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preempted. Second, at the same time, there is enough uncertainty in
this outcome to give state laws some room to have an effect.
II.

THE EASY CASE AGAINST PATENT FEDERALISM

Since the conventional wisdom is that the patent system depends on
uniformity, there must be good arguments against state involvement.
This Part explains that case. Courts and policymakers have long
assumed that uniformity is unusually important in patent law; indeed,
this belief drove the creation of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit.75 Disrupting this uniformity would undermine the
careful balance federal law strikes between encouraging innovation and
competition. It would do so both by changing that balance directly and
by increasing compliance costs. To be sure, these arguments are not
airtight; indeed, they rely on several key assumptions that may be
questionable. But they are strong enough that they should give state
policymakers pause before they enact their own patent policies.
First, as discussed above, and as the Supreme Court has repeatedly
emphasized in its preemption decisions, state laws threaten to upset the
delicate balance patent law strikes between competing goals: providing
innovation incentives while also promoting competition and a robust
public domain.76 While the Court has embraced this reasoning for
doctrinal reasons, to demonstrate how state law can act as an obstacle
to achieving patent law’s goals, it also demonstrates how state laws can
be normatively problematic. If patent law provides the right balance of
innovation and competition—and this is a big if, to which I will return
later77—then state patent policies can only make things worse by
hindering innovation incentives or competition.78
Different state laws would have different effects on this balance. A
state law that granted state-specific patent rights, for instance, would
have a greater effect than one that imposed a small tax on companies
licensing patent rights; both would create marginal innovation
incentives, but the scale of those incentives would be quite different.
The effect of a Vermont-style law on innovation incentives may be
small. Such laws merely make certain specific enforcement actions
75.
See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO.
L.J. 1437, 1453–58 (2012) (recounting the history of the creation of the Federal
Circuit).
76.
See supra notes 50–58 and accompanying text.
77.
See infra Part V.
78.
Again, it is worth emphasizing that this conclusion depends on the (rather
dubious) assumption that the federal patent system strikes the optimal balance between
innovation incentives and competition; if, instead, patent law over-weighted one factor
or the other, then state laws upsetting the federal-law balance might be welfareenhancing. See infra note 82.
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harder, rather than making it harder to enforce patents generally. And
regardless, the effect of any one state’s law is necessary attenuated in a
nation made up of fifty states. But if the law has any effect at all, it will
necessarily be felt on the margins, with some investors deciding the
benefits of patent protection are no longer great enough to make an
investment worthwhile. And when multiple states enact similar laws,
this effect is magnified. Given these effects, then, we can expect some
inventions that would have been made under the uniform federal patent
system—or, at least, some patents that would have been obtained under
the uniform system—not to happen if the state anti-patent laws have any
effect. This is the key social cost of such laws.
Second, the nationwide uniformity of the patent system helps
accomplish the patent system’s dual goals because it makes it easier for
businesses to invest and rely on patent protections without having to
navigate fifty different intellectual-property systems. Otherwise, the
cost of complying with fifty state intellectual-property regimes, and
optimizing business strategy consistent with those laws, would be
prohibitive for many businesses. And the marginal cost of a statedependent patent system is likely to be high, since the cost of
complying with multiple state laws will be disproportionately
concentrated in precisely the businesses that are most reliant on
intellectual property. This is so because businesses that invent new
things and rely on patent protections are unlikely to limit their
operations to one state; for one thing, such a business would be
sacrificing the value of its patent rights attributable to the markets of
the other forty-nine states (to say nothing of international markets).
In a uniform federal patent system, even a small business can have
a nationwide presence, because there are only a small number of
activities required to monetize patent rights, and those activities are the
same from state to state. A patent holder enforcing patent rights
typically would send demand letters, negotiate license agreements, and
file infringement lawsuits when necessary.79 But all those activities
work the same no matter where the enforcement target is located; even
the court system applies the same law, thanks to the Federal Circuit’s
nationwide appellate jurisdiction.80 In contrast, when states impose their
79.
A patent holder usually need not provide any pre-suit notice, but doing so
can often give the same outcome—money, in the form of payment for a license—at
lower cost than filing a preemptive lawsuit. The exception arises when a patent holder
sells a product embodying the patented invention but does not mark the product as
patented; then, the patent holder must provide pre-suit notice or cannot collect
infringement damages. See 28 U.S.C. § 287 (2012).
80.
See § 1295(a)(1) (vesting exclusive appellate jurisdiction in patentinfringement cases in the Federal Circuit); see also § 1295(a)(4) (same, for
administrative appeals from the Patent and Trademark Office). District courts do have
local rules that vary from court to court, of course, but the effect of such variations is
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own requirements on patent assertions, a patent holder must consider
each state’s requirements separately. For instance, several state antipatent laws impose substantive requirements on the contents of demand
letters;81 a patent holder engaging in a widespread enforcement
campaign, then, would have to work to ensure, at considerable
expense, that each demand letter complies with the relevant state’s
laws. And if it is ever unclear which state law applies, or if multiple
state laws could apply (for instance, if the state in which the sender is
located imposes requirements on letters sent from that state, while the
recipient’s state imposes different requirements on letters sent to that
state), then choice-of-law and conflicts-of-law problems could
complicate matters.
Third, and most troubling, is the possibility of rent seeking, with
state patent policies representing efforts by state lawmakers to enrich
their constituents at the expense of out-of-state companies. This is
possible because not all states are alike; some produce a
disproportionate share of patentable innovation, while others
disproportionately consume those innovations (in the form of licenses
or innovative new products). If each state is able to set its own
intellectual-property agenda, then states that disproportionately produce
innovation should adopt disproportionately strong intellectual-property
protections; states that disproportionately consume innovation should,
likewise, adopt weaker protections.82 Patent holders in innovator states,
then, would have less ability to enforce their patents against potential
defendants in consumer states, because it would be more costly to do so
and could subject them to liability. Likewise, potential defendants in
consumer states would have greater ability to use patented technology
without agreeing to license terms or risking a lawsuit. The result would
be a wealth transfer from out-of-state patent holders to potential
defendants in states that disproportionately consume innovation. And
small in the grand scheme of patent litigation, a costly endeavor. See, e.g., REPORT OF
ECONOMIC SURVEY 2011, AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N at I-153 (2011)
(finding, in a survey of patent lawyers, that the median cost of litigating a patent case to
final decision was $2.5 million when $1 million to $25 million was at stake and $5
million when more than $25 million was at stake).
81.
See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
82.
This does not require assuming that strong intellectual-property
protections lead to more innovation. Instead, the causation is the reverse: if innovators
believe they would benefit from strong intellectual-property protections, then states with
a disproportionately large number of innovators (who would, presumably, have
disproportionately large political influence) should adopt stronger protections.
Likewise, if consumers of innovation believe they would benefit from weaker
protections, then states with more innovation consumers should adopt weaker
protections. There could be second-order effects as well, for instance if an innovationconsumer state enacted strong IP protections to encourage more innovations to
consume. But these effects are likely to be much smaller than the first-order effects.
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while this effect would be on the margins—patent holders would still
bring some patent lawsuits in consumer states, and would undertake the
effort in some cases to comply with heightened notice requirements—it
could have a significant effect on marginal innovation.
Indeed, there are reasons to think this effect could be greater than
it seems, because selection effects could magnify the harm to
innovation. If a random subset of states enacts anti-patent laws, then
patent holders would face greater difficulties enforcing their patents
against those customers who happen to be located in those states. This
is an added cost, but one limited by the number of states that enact laws
and the strength of those laws. However, if states that
disproportionately consume patentable inventions are more likely to
enact these laws, then the best markets for patent holders become more
difficult to access. The effect on patent holders, then, is not merely
proportional to the number of states that enact anti-patent laws, or the
populations of those states; it is magnified by the degree to which states
rent seek.
To be sure, none of these arguments is without flaws. The
Supreme Court’s preemption decisions are explicitly based on the
premise that patent law strikes a careful balance between encouraging
innovation and competition.83 But what if federal law has struck the
wrong balance, or has done so using the wrong tools?
In that case, state patent policies could have a welfare-enhancing
role, because they could help correct the errors in federal patent law.
They could do this in different ways. One possibility is direct: if federal
law is tilted too far in the direction of innovation incentives at the
expense of competition, or vice versa, then state laws limiting the scope
or effect of patent rights might help undo this tilt.84 If the federal patent
system is too protective of patent holders, then, state laws weakening
federal patent rights would help move the overall legal system toward
the optimal point. Indeed, Part III will argue that this is the case.
Another possibility is indirect: if we are uncertain about patent
law’s optimal balance, or about the best means of obtaining that optimal
balance, then variation between state policies could help scholars and
policymakers determine the best policies. Indeed, Lisa Ouellette has
proposed that experimentalism in patent policy would help solve several
hotly contested issues in patent law, including the basic questions of
whether the marginal incentives that patents provide to innovate,
commercialize new innovations, and disclose those innovations to the

83.
84.

See supra notes 50–58 and accompanying text.
E.g., Hrdy, supra note 17.
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world are worth their tradeoffs.85 State patent policies would still cause
problems: the increased legal costs for firms would be significant. But
if they provide marginally valuable incentives, or valuable information
about the best approach to those incentives, then those benefits might
outweigh the costs.
These points suggest that many of the strongest arguments in
support of state patent policies are really arguments about the federal
patent system. If the federal patent system is serving its intended
purposes, then the arguments against state involvement present strong
reasons to think that there would be little benefit to getting states
involved. If the federal system has problems, though, or even just
specific features that could be improved, then states could play a
positive role. And this suggests that arguments in support of patent
federalism must be rooted, to a significant degree, in criticisms of the
federal patent system and must be tailored to address those criticisms.
The next Part makes that case.
III.

THE SUBSTANTIVE CASE FOR LIMITED PATENT
FEDERALISM

If state patent laws suffer from the flaws described in the last Part,
then the burden is high to justify state attempts to meddle in patent
policy. This Part provides a substantive case for a limited form of
patent federalism: Vermont-style laws that seek to make it harder to
bring patent-infringement claims. This is concededly an outcome-driven
argument, not one rooted in any principles of federalism. It stems from
the premise that the federal patent system has not settled at the best
balance between innovation and competition, or the best means of
achieving that balance. Instead, it assumes, federal patent law is
distorted in favor of patent holders and has chosen means that are too
costly for accused infringers. If those premises are correct, then state
anti-patent laws could help provide helpful reforms.
There is a near-consensus that the federal patent system has
problems. The Patent Office routinely grants invalid patents; patent
trolls routinely bring nuisance cases asserting those invalid patents; and
juries routinely hand out enormous damage awards to patent holders
who never really invented anything, at the expense of companies
developing successful products that really do benefit society. Or, at
least, that is a common narrative; and while this narrative may be
overstated, it contains some truth. States, in turn, can help restore the

85.
See Ouellette, supra note 17. To be sure, Ouellette concludes that
experimentalism should come from centrally controlled randomized trials, not through
unconstrained state-centered variation.
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balance between innovation and competition by moving the broader
system closer to the optimal point.
A. The Flawed Federal Patent System
Most patent scholars agree that the modern patent system does an
imperfect job of encouraging innovation. This section highlights four
common critiques: that the Patent Office grants low-quality patents; that
patent holders bring nuisance lawsuits designed to extract settlements
rather than enforce legitimate patent rights; that patent trolls and other
nonpracticing entities bring cases against productive companies,
extracting royalties for products that owe little or nothing to the
patentees’ work; and that patent holders bring claims against end users
and other defendants with low bargaining power.
The goal of this section is not to show that these critiques are
correct; rather, I take it as an assumption that they apply to the patent
system, or at least to significant parts of that system. Rather, my aim is
to highlight critiques that are especially relevant for state anti-patent
laws. These are, of course, not the only criticisms of the patent
system,86 but they are the ones that state anti-patent laws are designed
to target and on which such laws are likely to have the greatest effect.
1. THE PATENT-QUALITY CRITIQUE
The patent system’s biggest problem may be patent quality, with
examiners granting many problematic patents. These problems fall into
various categories. Some patents cover inventions that are not actually
new, or are not meaningfully different from what came before.87 Others
claim inventions broader than what an inventor actually invented, or
fail to inform practitioners how to make and use the claimed
invention.88 Still others are vague about what they claim, or have claims
that seem deliberately obfuscated or designed to be difficult to compare

86.
Other criticisms include both the broader, see, e.g., BOLDRIN & LEVINE,
supra note 21 (arguing for the complete elimination of the patent and copyright
systems); and the narrower, see, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 21 (arguing that the
patent system should take greater account of differences from industry to industry).
87.
Such patents fail patent law’s novelty and nonobviousness requirements.
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2012) (novelty and nonobviousness, respectively). Whether
or not a patent satisfies these requirements is the most basic definition of patent quality.
See generally Christi J. Guerrini, Defining Patent Quality, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3091
(2014); R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 2135 (2009).
88.
Such patents may fail patent law’s written-description and enablement
requirements. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012); Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598
F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
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to real-world products.89 These quality problems are surprising at first
glance, since patent law is the only major form of intellectual property
in which obtaining rights requires a detailed, substantive examination
by an expert examiner.90 Yet there are several reasons quality problems
persist.
One set of factors stems from the examination process itself.
Patent examination is an ex parte process, so examiners do not have the
benefit of adversarial presentation by parties on both sides of a dispute;
instead, they see only information and arguments tending to show that
an applicant is entitled to a patent. Though examiners are supposed to
conduct independent prior-art searches to overcome this limitation, they
have limited time to do so. Examiners also have skewed incentives:
they are rewarded (in productivity measures and bonuses) for granting
patents and penalized (in increased workload) for rejecting patent
applications. This stems from one of the stranger quirks of the United
States patent system, under which an application can never be
conclusively rejected by an examiner; instead, an applicant can always
revive an application after rejection. So for examiners, the only certain
way to get a file off one’s desk is to grant the application.91
These examination limitations are compounded by applicants’
incentives to obtain vague patents claims. Applicants want to obtain
patents as quickly and cheaply as possible while also ensuring that those
patents will prove valuable; both goals can be furthered by writing
vague claims. Vague claims can help an application move quickly
through examination, since they can make it harder to find relevant
prior art or to know if that prior art would invalidate the claims. And
they help an applicant respond when an examiner issues a rejection,
since vague claims can be twisted or interpreted flexibly to overcome
whatever prior art an examiner does find. Vague claims are most
valuable, though, after a patent is granted, since they can be asserted
against a broader array of products and services, and since they can be
interpreted after the fact to track industry developments. Patent law’s
89.
E.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L.
REV. 719, 757–67, 772–81 (2009); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L.
REV. 539, 552 (2009); Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L.
REV. 709, 746 (2012).
90.
Both copyright and trademark law employ systems of examination and
registration, but in neither case is that system a meaningful substantive limitation on
rights. In the copyright system, rights arise the moment a work is fixed in a tangible
medium of expression; registration is a formality, and examination simply assures that a
registered work is among the categories of works eligible for protection. See 17 U.S.C.
§§ 102(a), 408–411 (2012). And in the trademark system, registration provides
benefits, such as constructive nationwide notice of a trademark holder’s claim, but a
trademark can be protected whether or not it is ever registered. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052,
1072, 1114(1), 1125(a) (2012).
91.
See generally Ford, supra note 46, at 87–91.
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indefiniteness doctrine is designed to prevent applicants from obtaining
overly vague claims, but in practice imposes minor obstacles.92
There are also innocuous sources of low patent quality. Because
patents by their very nature deal with the cutting edge, it may
inherently be harder to precisely describe a new invention than
something conventional, since terminology may not yet exist to describe
the invention. And even when a patent originates in a longstanding
field, words can rarely be stripped of all ambiguity; patent law has long
assumed that language has inherent ambiguities that make it impossible
to craft perfect patent claims, or at least that patent drafters have
incentives to use such ambiguous language.93
These patent-quality problems also feed into the nuisance-litigation
and patent-troll critiques, discussed below, because they make it easier
to obtain and enforce patent rights, even when those patent rights are
undeserved or that enforcement is abusive.
2. THE PATENT-TROLL CRITIQUE
The most common, and most commonly debated, critique of the
patent system in recent years is that it is overrun with patent trolls, or
nonpracticing entities, or licensing firms—all names for firms that
assert patent rights without making anything themselves. These firms
are a problem, the critique goes, because they extract judgments or
settlements from companies producing products without contributing
any value to those products, or to society.
To a significant degree, patent trolls may be symptoms of other
problems in the patent system rather than a problem in their own
right.94 For instance, they sometimes extract settlements by bringing
nuisance litigation; then there is essentially no difference between the
patent-troll critique and the nuisance-litigation critique addressed in the
next section.95 Other times, trolls bring reasonably strong patent claims,
92.
See generally Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120
(2014).
93.
E.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 21, at 57; Dan L. Burk & Mark A.
Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA.
L. REV. 1743, 1745–46 (2009); Tun-Jen Chiang, Forcing Patent Claims, 113 MICH. L.
REV. 513 (2015); Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim, 42
SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 40 (2012).
94.
E.g., Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for
the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (2013).
95.
See, e.g., Colleen Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 461, 477 (2014) (noting “bottom feeder” trolls, which “make demands of many
companies at once in order to get nuisance settlements”); David L. Schwartz, The Rise
of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent Litigation, 64 ALA. L. REV. 335, 370 (2012)
(noting that lawyers at the “bottom” of the contingent-fee patent bar often represent
non-practicing entities).
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and the critique must be rooted elsewhere. One possibility is some sort
of asymmetry between trolls and practicing entities, for instance
because practicing entities face constraints that trolls do not.96 Another
possibility is that trolls are more likely to engage in abusive tactics or
behave in ways that reveal other flaws in the patent system.97 Yet the
evidence is weak that trolls behave differently from other patent
holders, at least in the aggregate; instead, they appear to get more
attention for essentially the same behavior that other patent holders
undertake.98
Moreover, there are reasons to think that trolls can be socially
beneficial. The troll label applies when a patent holder does not practice
the claimed invention, but there is no reason to expect those who are
good at inventing new technologies to also be good at commercializing
those technologies. Just as specialization in the broader economy leads
to gains from trade, patent trolls may efficiently separate invention
from commercialization. Universities are the classic example:
universities are very good at inventing new technologies, but they lack
the expertise in operations, manufacturing, sales, and management to
build those technologies into viable businesses. So they routinely
license their intellectual property to others to commercialize, and they
routinely assert those intellectual-property rights against nonlicensees.99 And the same story can be told about other non-practicing
entities. When an inventor develops a new technology but fails to
commercialize it, she may nevertheless have created significant
potential value—value that may be realized when others succeed in
commercializing the invention.100

96.
E.g., Lemley & Melamed, supra note 94, at 2129–46 (discussing the
argument that trolls are uniquely unconstrained because they cannot be deterred by the
threat of competitive responses, and concluding that the argument is unpersuasive).
97.
E.g., id. at 2146–66.
98.
E.g., id. at 2166–70.
99.
Though if universities are good at inventing new technologies, they may
be surprisingly bad at monetizing those inventions. See Brian J. Love, Do University
Patents Pay Off? Evidence from a Survey of University Inventors in Computer Science
and Electrical Engineering, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 285 (2014).
100.
This story is significantly undercut, of course, when the successful
commercializer is also an independent inventor; in that case, the unsuccessful first
inventor really has contributed little to society. But the basic premise of the patent
system is that rewarding the first inventor leads to greater innovation in the long run,
both because it encourages earlier invention and because it leads to disclosure of new
inventions. If this basic premise is true—and it is a fundamental and hotly contested
premise—then the occasional failure is a necessary cost of the enterprise.

2017:551

The Uneasy Case for Patent Federalism

577

3. THE NUISANCE-LITIGATION CRITIQUE
A variant of the patent-troll critique focuses on the most
problematic troll behavior: bringing nuisance litigation that is designed
to exploit litigation costs and asymmetric bargaining power to extract
nuisance settlements.
As I have discussed in previous work, a combination of features of
the patent system encourages applicants to seek patents even when their
primary value is nuisance value.101 Patent litigation is extraordinarily
expensive—defending a case can cost hundreds of thousands or millions
of dollars even in relatively simple cases.102 And because much of this
cost comes from discovery, which can include wide-ranging discovery
both into the technical details of the defendant’s products (for the merits
of the patent case) and into the defendant’s sales, profitability, and
licensing practices (for damages), it usually cannot be avoided through
dismissal or summary judgment.103 So almost any patent lawsuit—
including even a nakedly unmeritorious suit—has a nuisance settlement
value in the tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars; even such a
settlement would cost far less than litigating the case.104 At the same
time, in general, it can cost $20,000 to $30,000 to prosecute a patent
application, far less than the nuisance settlement value of a typical
patent.105 So it is worth getting even a low-quality patent, and given the
101.
See Roger Allan Ford, The Patent Spiral, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 827, 841–
54 (2016).
102.
REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2011, AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW
ASS’N at I-153 to I-154 (2011) (reporting median costs of litigating patent cases,
through trial, of $650,000 in cases with less than $1 million at stake and $5 million
when more than $25 million was at stake).
103.
A notable exception to this arises when a patent fails to claim patentable
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). Since the Supreme Court’s decision in
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014), district courts have granted
numerous motions to dismiss patent cases after concluding that the asserted claims were
directed to unpatentable abstract ideas. See, e.g., Michael D. Wilburn et al., Pretrial
Dismissals and Judgments in Post-Alice Courts, ALSTON & BIRD LLP (Apr. 23, 2015),
http://www.alston.com/publications/pretrial-dismissals-and-judgements-in-post-alicecourts/ [https://perma.cc/FJV5-C54S]. With software patents and business-method
patents, in particular, dismissal under Alice may prove to be a significant impediment to
nuisance litigation. Id. But it is not a universal solution, since the patents that are likely
to be vulnerable under the Alice test are almost entirely software patents and businessmethod patents. Id.
104.
E.g., Schwartz, supra note 95, at 369–70 (“Often these lawyers [at the
‘bottom’ of the contingent-fee market] will propose settlement amounts that are lower,
often far lower, than the amount that it will cost an accused infringer to defend itself. .
. . Sometimes the demands are as low as $5,000 or $10,000.”).
105.
See, e.g., David Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual
Property, 65 VAND. L. REV. 677, 689–90 (2012) (estimating that “an average patentee
will spend approximately $22,000 to successfully prosecute a patent application”);
Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495,
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quality problems discussed in the last subsection, it is readily possible
to do so.106
Empirical evidence suggests that nuisance litigation plays a role in
the patent system, though it is hard to tell how significant that role is.
One indicator that nuisance suits may represent a large fraction of
patent cases is the number of cases that settle quickly, within 180 days
of filing. Between 2000 and 2013, 33.3% of the 43,166 patent lawsuits
filed were terminated in PACER within 180 days of filing.107 This is
notable because six months is practically instantaneous in the time scale
of high-stakes commercial litigation; patent cases that are resolved on
the merits typically take two, three, or more years just to be resolved in
the district court. So these quickly resolved cases generally represent
settlements, walk-away agreements, or unilateral dismissals by
plaintiffs. And the more quickly a case is settled, the more likely it is to
be a nuisance settlement, since settlements that occur before significant
discovery has taken place are more likely designed to avoid litigation
costs and since the parties are less likely before discovery to have
enough information to evaluate the merits of the case. The more cases
that settle quickly, then, the more we should expect to see nuisance
cases.
Another indicator of the role that nuisance suits play in the patent
system comes from surveys of frequent patent defendants. For instance,
RPX Corp., a firm that buys patents to prevent them from being
asserted against corporate clients, has found in surveys of its clients that
more than half of lawsuits brought by non-practicing entities were
settled within six months.108 And in another RPX study, this one of
patent settlements, the firm found that attorney fees and litigation costs
exceeded settlement payments in all but the most expensive category of
cases.109
1498 & n.13 (2001) (estimating that “the general range of costs for prosecuting a patent
from start to finish . . . appears to be $10,000 to $30,000 per patent”). The total will
vary from patent to patent depending on the invention’s complexity and other factors.
106.
I develop this point in greater detail in Ford, supra note 101.
107.
These numbers are calculated from a dataset provided by Lex Machina,
which compiles information about intellectual-property litigation in federal courts. See
LEX MACHINA, http://www.lexmachina.com/ [https://perma.cc/PE9V-GK2P] (last
visited Mar. 30, 2017). I discuss this method at Ford, supra note 101, at 861–62. For
information on the advantages of relying on Lex Machina, compared to other sources
like LexisNexis, Westlaw, and PACER, see John R. Allison et al., Understanding the
Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1769, 1772–73 (2014).
108.
2013 NPE LITIGATION REPORT, RPX CORP. at 37 (2014), http://www.
rpxcorp.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/RPX-2013-NPE-Litigation-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/72RQ-2MA8].
109.
2012 NPE COST STUDY: HIGH-LEVEL FINDINGS, RPX CORP. at 9 (2013),
http://www.rpxcorp.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/RPX’s-NPE-Cost-Study-results.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M7U7-QZXG].
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4. THE END-USER-LITIGATION CRITIQUE
A related critique that has recently been made of the patent system
is that it is too easy for patent holders to sue end users of a product
rather than the company that makes and sells the product. Under
American patent law, a patent holder has the choice of whom to sue,
since making, using, selling, offering to sell, and importing a patent
invention all constitute infringement.110 In the scanner-troll cases, for
instance, the patent holders could have targeted the companies that
made the scanners, or the stores that sold them; instead, they targeted
the small businesses that used them to scan documents.111 As a matter
of doctrine, there is nothing wrong with this; if the scanners embodied
a patented invention, then using them is just as infringing as making
and selling them would be.112
Even though it is perfectly legal, we should still be wary of enduser patent litigation because it should be less efficient than pursuing
upstream manufacturers and sellers. If a patent holder has to sue
thousands of small businesses that use networked scanners, for
instance, that requires wasteful duplication of demand letters, complaint
drafting, filing fees, and so forth. When a patent holder nevertheless
elects to sue end users, we should ask why it is voluntarily taking on
higher costs. And the likely answer is not good: suing end users
suggests that the patent holder relies less on the underlying merits of
the claim and more on asymmetric bargaining power to extract
settlements. If the legal merits of the claim were strong, then a patent
holder should be able to get the same damages suing the manufacturer
as suing end users, since the usual measures of patent damages, lost
profits and a reasonable royalty, generally scale linearly with the
number of units sold.113 But if the goal is to use the threat of attorney
fees to extract an early settlement, then measures that drive up those
110.
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
111.
This assumes that the scanner itself was alleged to infringe the applicable
patent claims, since in that case the scanner would be the “patented invention”
contemplated by the statute. Id. But the point is generally true even when the patent
claim only covers the use of the machine, since in that case the manufacturer would
commit contributory infringement or induced infringement. See id. §§ 271(b)–(c).
112.
And there are good reasons for this, since otherwise patent law would be
rife with loopholes. Companies buying specialized equipment to use in manufacturing
could escape liability by buying overseas; farmers replanting patented seeds would be
immune from liability, see Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013); and end
users would lack standing to challenge patent rights in court, see Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). These examples are
discussed in Bernstein, supra note 7, at 1445–46.
113.
On patent damages, see generally 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012); Grain
Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Products Co., 185 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 1999);
Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1978).
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fees—like suing end users—work to a patent holder’s advantage. So
does targeting defendants, like small businesses, who are more sensitive
to those fees.114 And end-user defendants are likely to be easier targets
for weak claims because they are often one-time players in the patent
game and have less technical knowledge of the accused products or the
asserted patents, and so are less equipped to defend suits on the
merits.115
B. The Corresponding Benefits of State Anti-Patent Laws
Several of the state anti-patent laws that have been enacted are well
tailored to address some of these critiques of the federal patent system.
In particular, the laws may address portions of the patent-quality
critique and are quite well suited to addressing the nuisance-litigation
and end-user-litigation critiques. They are more poorly suited,
however, to addressing the patent-troll critique, to the extent patent
trolls are a problem independent of the other critiques.
First, the state laws help respond to the patent-quality critique by
making it harder to enforce low-quality patents. They do this in several
ways. Some state laws specifically consider the quality of the patent.
The Vermont law, for instance, asks whether “[t]he claim or assertion
of patent infringement is meritless, and the person knew, or should
have known, that the claim or assertion is meritless”116 and whether the
patent holder “offers to license the patent for an amount that is not
based on a reasonable estimate of the value of the license.”117 If so, that
weighs in favor of a bad-faith finding. State laws can also impose duediligence requirements that are hard to satisfy with a low-quality patent.
Vermont again, for instance, asks whether the patent holder “fails to
conduct an analysis comparing the claims in the patent to the target’s
products, services, and technology,” or when such an analysis was
done, whether it “does not identify specific areas in which the products,
services, and technology are covered by the claims in the patent.”118 It
is difficult to provide a good-faith analysis of conduct infringing a lowquality patent. And state laws can ban false threats to sue, as Illinois
has done; this has a disproportionate impact on low-quality patents,
since patent holders who realize that their patents are vulnerable are
much less likely to follow through on litigation threats.119

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Bernstein, supra note 7, at 1450.
Id. at 1446–47.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4197(b)(6) (2016).
§ 4197(b)(5).
§ 4197(b)(2).
See, e.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2SSS(b)(1) (2015).
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State laws are not, however, a perfect response to the patentquality critique, since instead of focusing on invalid patents, they focus
on a patent holder’s investigation into a target’s allegedly infringing
conduct. This is a key disconnect in the state laws: no state has gone
after low-quality patents directly, such as by forcing patent holders to
undertake validity analyses or to justify their patents’ validity in
demand letters. Such laws would almost certainly be preempted, since
federal law is clear that patents are entitled to a presumption of
validity.120 And although the overlap between low-quality patents and
the pre-suit behavior targeted by the state laws is high, it is not perfect;
in particular, state laws do more to affect patent holders with weak
infringement cases than with weak invalidity cases, due to that
presumption of validity.
Second, states can respond to nuisance litigation and end-user
litigation by increasing the cost of these mass-litigation strategies
enough to make them uneconomical. MPHJ, the scanner troll, sent
more than 16,000 demand letters to small businesses,121 and just like
senders of spam email, MPHJ’s entire business model depended on the
low cost of sending letters. If even a small percentage of recipients
agreed to license the asserted patents, then that small upfront cost
would be more than covered by licensing revenue. But if state law
increases the cost of sending demand letters, then a company cannot
adopt the spammer strategy. And other provisions have similar effects;
for instance, provisions that ban false threats to sue, or inflated royalty
demands, reduce the effectiveness of the strategy because they limit the
patent holder’s ability to extract settlements.
State anti-patent laws are well suited to combatting these end-user
and nuisance-litigation strategies. The scanner-troll cases that inspired
states to get involved were classic end-user cases, for instance, brought
against small businesses that had no role in designing or producing the
allegedly infringing products. The state laws would make it
significantly harder to bring such cases, since they would
disproportionately raise the cost of bringing end-user cases. This is so
because the pre-suit requirements imposed by the state laws impose
costs—of investigating the defendant’s infringing activity, preparing
infringement allegations, and so forth—that are essentially fixed per
case. But end-user cases are likely to be smaller in scale, so these costs
reflect a greater portion of the overall burden of bringing a patent case.
If the scanner trolls had to satisfy the pre-suit requirements for each of
120. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 564
U.S. 91, 91–92 (2011); Ford, supra note 46, at 103–04; Doug Lichtman & Mark A.
Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 47
(2007).
121. Johnson, supra note 44, at 2024.
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their 16,000 end-user lawsuits, that would impose a much greater
burden than if they sued a half dozen scanner manufacturers. So the
state laws would make end-user litigation harder without formally
targeting those cases. At the same time, state anti-patent laws only do
so much to combat end-user litigation; they cannot ban it outright, or
impose additional requirements on it, without clearly conflicting with
federal law.
Nuisance litigation is similarly targeted. Because the settlement
pressure of a nuisance suit is driven by litigation costs, a nuisance case
can be brought without regard to the underlying merits, so long as the
complaint can pass muster under Rule 11. So a nuisance plaintiff has no
need to carefully analyze the defendant’s products, develop claim
charts, or perform other extensive pre-litigation investigation. But
failure to perform such an investigation is precisely the conduct
targeted by most states. Vermont’s law, for instance, considers whether
a patent holder identifies “factual allegations concerning the specific
areas in which the target’s products, services, and technology infringe
the patent or are covered by the claims in the patent,”122 or has
“conduct[ed] an analysis comparing the claims in the patent to the
target’s products, services, and technology.”123 Other laws target failure
to inform a defendant of specific infringement allegations—which is
only possible with a pre-suit investigation. So to the extent state antipatent laws have any effect on litigants’ behavior, they should affect the
behavior of plaintiffs bringing nuisance cases. State anti-patent laws,
then, are well suited to targeting the two most troubling kinds of patent
litigation—the ones designed to extract undeserved settlements, not to
enforce legitimate patent rights.
Third, to the extent that patent trolls are themselves a problem,
apart from their use of nuisance and end-user litigation, state laws can
also target them by considering a patent holder’s status. In Vermont,
for instance, the law considers as a factor weighing against a finding of
bad-faith patent assertions whether the patent holder “makes a
substantial investment in the use of the patent or in the production or
sale of a product or item covered by the patent” or is the original
inventor.124 The idea is that a practicing entity enforcing patent rights
that cover its own product is likely acting in good faith, since it is
generating social value by selling its own products and since it is well
positioned to know which competitors’ products are similar enough to
infringe. But these provisions are likely on even shakier preemption

122.
123.
124.

tit. 9, § 4197(b)(1)(C).
§ 4197(b)(2).
§§ 4197(c)(4), (5).
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ground than other state laws, since federal law expressly contemplates
that patents are alienable property.125
These provisions are also normatively questionable, since there are
legitimate arguments that patent trolls or nonpracticing entities can be
useful to the patent system. Despite these benefits, though, patent trolls
are core targets of the state anti-patent laws. The laws have been widely
identified as anti-troll measures, by both academics and the media, and
trolls were cited by state legislators and witnesses testifying in support
of the laws.126 If patent trolls really are a problem, though, the state
laws are only weakly tailored to solving that problem. The laws largely
address pre-litigation conduct, but a patent troll is not defined by its
conduct before filing suit; if the real problem with patent trolls is that
they do not make products, then the state laws may have little effect.
IV.

THE INSTITUTIONAL CASE FOR LIMITED PATENT
FEDERALISM

The last Part detailed the substantive case for limited patent
federalism by highlighting flaws in the federal patent system and ways
in which state anti-patent laws can help counter those flaws. The natural
follow-up is to wonder if the flaws in the federal system are inevitable,
or if there are federal reforms that could eliminate the need for states to
get involved in the first place.
This Part makes the institutional case for limited patent federalism.
It first highlights ways in which the public-choice economics of the
federal patent system has rendered its institutions resistant to reform.
While courts have embraced substantial reforms—largely at the
insistence of the Supreme Court, in the face of resistance by lower
federal courts—Congress has been reluctant to act. It then examines the
corresponding institutions in the states, which have stepped into the
void left by Congress. States have their own public-choice problems,
but in this context those problems happen to offset those in the federal
government. The result is institutional dynamics that target the most

125.
See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012) (governing ownership and assignment of
patent rights).
126.
E.g., Eric Goldman, Vermont Enacts the Nation’s First Anti-Patent
Trolling Law, FORBES (May 22, 2013, 2:22 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
ericgoldman/2013/05/22/vermont-enacts-the-nations-first-anti-patent-trolling-law/
[https://perma.cc/ZU68-3HVJ]; Parija Kavilanz, Vermont Fights Back Against ‘Patent
Trolls,’ CNN MONEY (May 24, 2013, 10:09 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/05/24/
smallbusiness/patent-trolls/ [https://perma.cc/N6NJ-B7FG]; Timothy B. Lee, How
Vermont Could Save the Nation from Patent Trolls, WASH. POST (Aug. 1, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/08/01/how-vermont-couldsave-the-nation-from-patent-trolls/ [https://perma.cc/58CH-EEHQ].
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problematic patent assertions while having surprisingly few effects on
socially desirable patent assertions.
A. The Flawed Institutions of the Federal Patent System
The federal patent system is complex, with institutions in all three
branches of the federal government playing roles. The design of these
institutions has played a significant role in many of the patent system’s
failures discussed in the last Part. Some of these failures are likely
inherent in the institutional design; others could in theory be reformed,
but reform is made more difficult by the institutional design. This
section surveys the three branches of the federal government and
discusses how they have contributed to the status quo.
1. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH: THE PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
The Patent and Trademark Office is the part of the executive
branch that administers most of the patent system.127 The principal job
of the Office is to review patent applications and determine when
patents should issue, though it also handles administrative litigation
over patent issuance and administers various procedures for reviewing
patents after they have been granted.128 And although it does much of
this job well, the structure of the Office contributes to the patent-quality
critique highlighted above.129 In other work, I have explained how the
structure of the examination process may lead to a continuous cycle of
lower-quality patents.130 Several other structural features of the Office
also reduce average patent quality.
The Office has been tasked with what is, in some respects, an
impossible job: figure out when an invention really is new, based
largely on the inventor’s (or her attorney’s) description of that
invention. And the institutional context of that decision makes it
127.
There are other scattered pieces of the executive branch that play roles in
the patent system, largely arising out of its intersection with trade policy. Examples
include the International Trade Commission, which handles administrative patent
litigation arising under the federal ban on unfair trade practices, see 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337(b) (2012); Customs and Border Protection, the component of the Department of
Homeland Security that blocks importation of infringing goods upon issuance of an
exclusion order by the ITC (along with counterfeit goods and goods infringing
copyrights), see § 1337(d); and the Office of the United States Trade Representative,
which negotiates intellectual-property-related trade agreements, see §§ 2112,
2114a(c)(7), 2171.
128. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–42 (2012).
129. See supra Part III.A.1. The Office plays a minimal role in patent
litigation, and has no say in who applies for patents, so contributes far less to the other
critiques highlighted above.
130. See Ford, supra note 101.
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especially difficult to make correctly, since examiners are overwhelmed
with work, lack complete information about patent applications and the
prior art, and are rewarded for the wrong behavior.131 Patent examiners
spend about eighteen hours on an average patent application, often
spread out over multiple years; this time includes time spent reviewing
the application, conducting a prior-art search, reviewing both the prior
art uncovered by that search and the prior art submitted by the
applicant, determining if the invention is patentable in light of that prior
art, preparing office actions (often several), reviewing and responding
to applicant, and so forth.132 A key step in this process is the prior-art
review, but examiners often remain ignorant of key prior art because
searches are often incomplete, applicants are under no obligation to
conduct a search before filing for a patent, and competitors with an
incentive to do so are marginalized in the process.133 And examiners are
judged by their productivity. Though both grants and denials count
toward this measure, the structure of the patent statute means that only
a patent grant conclusively closes a file; an applicant can always try
again, no matter how many times her application has been rejected.134
Examiners also must justify rejections, but not allowances.135 The result
is a system that encourages examiners to conduct reviews that are
cursory rather than searching, and to issue low-quality patents that are
nevertheless accorded a legal presumption of validity.136

131. See Ford, supra note 46, at 88–89 (explaining how the structure of the
Patent and Trademark Office leads to low-quality patents).
132.
Id. at 89.
133.
See Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 120, at 54–56; Victor Wong, Going
from Inquisitorial to Adversarial—By “Victor W,” YALE L. TECH. (Apr. 22, 2011),
http://www.yalelawtech.org/ip-in-the-digital-age/going-from-inquisitorial-toadversarial/ [https://perma.cc/924W-8NXC].
134.
Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office Grant Too Many Bad Patents?: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment,
67 STAN. L. REV. 613, 625–31 (2015); Ford, supra note 46, at 88; Lemley, supra note
105, at 1496 n.3; Sean Tu, Luck/Unluck of the Draw: An Empirical Study of Examiner
Allowance Rates, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, at 7–8.
135. See 35 U.S.C. § 131 (2012) (“[I]f on . . . examination it appears that the
applicant is entitled to a patent under the law, the Director shall issue a patent
therefor.”); In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992), abrogated on other
grounds by KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (holding that § 131
imposes a burden upon examiners to justify rejections); Corinne Langinier & Philippe
Marcoul, Monetary and Implicit Incentives of Patent Examiners (Univ. of Alta. Dep’t
of Econ., Working Paper No. 2009-22, 2009), http://www.economics.ualberta.ca/~/
media/economics/FacultyAndStaff/WPs/WP2009-22-Langinier.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QK7P-XK96] (proposing to reward examiners for rejections instead of
allowances).
136. See also 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012) (creating a presumption that patents
are valid); Ford, supra note 46, at 88; supra Part III.A.1.
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Empirical evidence demonstrates that examiners respond to these
incentives; examiners, like everybody else, act to maximize their own
utility rather than to further the best interests of the patent system.137
For instance, one study found that when examiners are promoted,
leaving less time to spend on examination, they cite less prior art,
become less likely to make time-consuming obviousness rejections, and
become more likely to grant patent applications.138 That study
concluded that time constraints on examiners inflate the Office’s patentgrant rate by approximately fourteen percentage points.139 Another
study found that more-senior patent examiners systematically cite less
prior art and are more likely to grant patents than more-junior
examiners.140 Examiners are also subject to the same cognitive biases as
everybody else. For instance, one study found that examiners
systematically disregard prior art submitted by patent applicants at the
expense of art the examiners find themselves.141 This finding held up
regardless of how many citations a patent applicant submitted and
regardless of the relevance of the art, suggesting that examiners see
greater value in prior art they find themselves, regardless of actual
value.142
137. With apologies to Richard Posner. See Richard A. Posner, What Do
Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT.
ECON. REV. 1 (1993).
138. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Is the Time Allocated to
Review Patent Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents?: Evidence
from Micro-Level Application Data, REV. ECON. & STAT. (forthcoming 2017), http://
www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/REST_a_00605
[https://perma.cc/DYV9ZQUL].
139. Id. at 28 (“[O]ur analysis implies that if all examiners were allocated as
many hours as are extended to GS-7 examiners, the Patent Office’s overall grant rate
would fall by roughly 14 percentage points, or nearly 20 percent. Based on 2013 filing
numbers this would amount to approximately 114,000 fewer issued patents for that
year.”).
140. Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Examiner Characteristics and Patent
Office Outcomes, 94 REV. ECON. & STAT. 817, 822 (2012). Another study concluded
that this represented rational movement between two local optima: a “when in doubt,
reject” strategy that is optimal when one’s work is being closely supervised, and a
“when in doubt, grant” strategy that becomes preferable when one’s work is no longer
subject to close scrutiny. See Tu, supra note 134, 20–21.
141. Christopher A. Cotropia et al., Do Applicant Patent Citations Matter?, 42
RES. POL’Y 844, 847, 853 (2013).
142. Id. at 851. There are several possible explanations for why examiners
would prefer to rely on prior art they find to prior art submitted by applicants. One
possibility is that doing so might be easier for examiners, since the processes of finding
and analyzing art overlap. Another possibility is that examiners are more likely to trust
or see value in information they have a hand in producing. See, e.g., Christopher
Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property: An Experiment, 96
CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2010); Cotropia et al., supra note 41, at 851; Michael I. Norton et
al., The IKEA Effect: When Labor Leads to Love, 22 J. CONSUMER PSYCH. 453, 457–58
(2012).
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These factors lead to quality problems when measured against a
baseline of “correct” application of prevailing patent doctrine,143 but
there is also the possibility that the Office is administering a
normatively problematic version of patent law. And the Office has
played a role there as well, in ways that may have led to an undesirable
expansion of patent rights.144
To be sure, there are structural features that help reduce quality
problems at the Office. The Office administers several mechanisms to
review patents and revoke them when they prove invalid.145 Those
procedures employ a broader standard for claim construction than is
employed in district-court litigation, asking what the broadest
reasonable interpretation is of a patent claim; this makes it easier to
invalidate a marginal claim.146 And the Office has instituted an
Enhanced Patent Quality Initiative and appointed a Deputy
Commissioner for Patent Quality to find ways to combat quality
problems in the patent system.147 The Initiative is overseeing several
programs to improve patent quality, including a pilot program to gauge
the use of glossaries in patent specifications,148 a program to conduct
early interviews between applicants and examiners,149 and a pioneering
143. See generally R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality
Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2138 (2009) (defining patent quality by
reference to the rules of patentability). But see Christi J. Guerrini, Defining Patent
Quality, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3091 (2014).
144. See, e.g., Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470 (2011)
(positing that the interplay of Patent and Trademark Office granting decisions and
administrative appeals to the Federal Circuit leads to a gradual expansion in
patentability over time); Melissa F. Wasserman, The PTO’s Asymmetric Incentives:
Pressure to Expand Substantive Patent Law, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 379 (2011) (positing that
internal incentives in the Patent and Trademark Office and interactions with the Federal
Circuit lead to a gradual expansion in patentability over time). But see Lisa Larrimore
Ouellette, What Are the Sources of Patent Inflation? An Analysis of Federal Circuit
Patentability Rulings, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 347 (2011).
145. These procedures include ex parte reexamination, see 35 U.S.C. §§ 301–
307 (2012); inter partes review, see §§ 311–318; post-grant review, see §§ 321–329;
and “covered business method” review, see id.; Leahy-Smith America Invents Act,
Pub. L. No. 112–29, § 18, 125 Stat. 284, 329 (2011).
146. See In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., 793 F.3d 1297, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(denying rehearing en banc).
147.
See Request for Comments on Enhancing Patent Quality, 80 Fed. Reg.
6475 (Feb. 5, 2015) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1); Michelle K. Lee, USPTO
Launches Enhanced Patent Quality Initiative, UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFF. (Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/uspto_launches_
enhanced_patent_quality [https://perma.cc/8EMN-CZ9H].
148.
Press Release, USPTO, USPTO Launches New Glossary Pilot Program
to Promote Patent Claim Clarity (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.uspto.gov/aboutus/news-updates/uspto-launches-new-glossary-pilot-program-promote-patent-claimclarity [https://perma.cc/2CCF-M9Q9].
149. US Patent & Trademark Office, Full First Action Interview Pilot
Program, 1367 OFFICIAL GAZETTE PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF. 42 (2011),
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program to crowd-source prior art.150 It is too early to tell, however,
how large an effect these efforts will have.
2. THE JUDICIAL BRANCH: THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND THE DISTRICT
COURTS
Once a patent has been issued by the Patent Office, enforcement is
left largely to civil litigation brought by the patent holder.151 Two
components of the judiciary that hear many patent cases, the Federal
Circuit and certain district courts, have contributed significantly to the
flaws in the patent system discussed above.
The Federal Circuit was created in 1982 with the goal of bringing
greater uniformity to patent law, a field that in the preceding decades
had been characterized by great disuniformity between the regional
circuits, forum shopping by patent holders and potential defendants,
and general disinterest from the Supreme Court.152 And the court
succeeded in creating greater uniformity; gone are the days when the
choice of circuit would have a greater-than-fifty-percent effect on the
chances that the patent would be found valid.153 But the Federal Circuit
has brought its own problems. It has developed a reputation as a patentfriendly court, shaping doctrine in ways that benefit patent holders at
the expense of accused infringers.154 It seems to have a frosty
https://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/com/sol/og/2011/week23/TOC.htm#ref11
[https://perma.cc/PP7J-TV3N].
150. Request for Comments and Notice of Roundtable on USPTO Use of
Crowdsourcing to Identify Relevant Prior Art, 79 Fed. Reg. 67159 (Nov. 12, 2014).
151. With, again, minor trade-related exceptions. See supra note 127.
152. See generally Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction,
100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1454–64 (2012).
153. Scott E. Atkinson et al., The Economics of a Centralized Judiciary:
Uniformity, Forum Shopping, and the Federal Circuit, 52 J.L. & ECON. 411, 433
(2009) (“[A]ll else constant, a switch from the Third Circuit to the Tenth Circuit in the
pre-CAFC era results in an increased likelihood of patent validity of .52.”); see also J.
Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 631, 646–49
(2015); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 8–11 (1989). The Federal Circuit has not eliminated
variability and uncertainty on appeal; the court has seen a great deal of internal
disagreement. E.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, Determining Uniformity within the
Federal Circuit by Measuring Dissent and En Banc Review, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 801,
818 (2010); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding?
An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1111–12
(2004).
154.
E.g., Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power
Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and NonInjunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985, 1024 (1999); William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, An Empirical Analysis of the Patent Court, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
111, 112 (2004); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property
Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 94–95 (1999).
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relationship with the Supreme Court, resisting attempts from above to
change patent doctrine.155 It is overly reliant on rules that enhance its
own power over standards that might give more power to the Patent
and Trademark Office or the district courts.156 And it is internally slow
to move when patent doctrine needs changing or correction.157
These characteristics of the Federal Circuit have contributed to the
critiques of patent law described above. The Federal Circuit has shifted
substantive patent law in ways that exacerbate the patent-quality
problem, for instance, by essentially gutting the definiteness
requirement,158 or by interpreting few claims as means-plus-function

155. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo Collaborative Services v.
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), holding that method claims
covering a medical diagnostic test were not patentable, patent lawyer Gene Quinn
expressed the pro-Federal Circuit view:
How long will it take the Federal Circuit to overrule this
inexplicable nonsense? The novice reader may find that question to
be ignorant, since the Supreme Court is the highest court of the
United States. Those well acquainted with the industry know that
the Supreme Court is not the final word on patentability, and while
the claims at issue in this particular case are unfortunately lost, the
Federal Circuit will work to moderate (and eventually overturn) this
embarrassing display by the Supreme Court. This will eventually be
accomplished the same as it was after the Supreme Court
definitively ruled software is not patentable in Gottschalk v. Benson,
[409 U.S. 63 (1972),] and the same as the ruling in KSR [Int’l Co.]
v. Teleflex [Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007)] will be overruled.
Gene Quinn, Killing Industry: The Supreme Court Blows Mayo v. Prometheus,
IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/03/20/supremecourt-mayo-v-prometheus/id=22920/ [https://perma.cc/SF4Q-YXCB].
156. Jonathan S. Masur, Regulating Patents, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 276–77;
David Olson & Stefania Fusco, Rules Versus Standards: Competing Notions of
Inconsistency Robustness in Patent Law, 64 ALA. L. REV. 647 (2013).
157. Jeremy W. Bock, Restructuring the Federal Circuit, 3 N.Y.U. J. INTELL.
PROP. & ENT. L. 197, 201–04 (2014) (arguing that the Federal Circuit is especially
sensitive to delays in correcting erroneous precedent, both because patent law is
sensitive to advances in technology and because the court lacks the percolation
mechanism by which regional circuits identify issues requiring additional scrutiny).
158. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012). Under the Federal Circuit’s forgiving
standard, a claim was immune to an indefiniteness challenge unless it was “not
amenable to construction” or “insolubly ambiguous.” See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig
Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2130 (2014) (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s test).
Under the Federal Circuit’s test, few cases turned on indefiniteness challenges: fewer
than ten percent of patentability cases, according to one study. See Ouellette, supra note
144, at 355–56 (finding that 28 of 324 patentability cases in selected years turned on
indefiniteness, compared to 119 on anticipation and 167 on obviousness). And another
study found that patentees became increasingly likely to prevail in indefiniteness
challenges, especially in district courts, from 1998 to 2008. Christa J. Laser, A Definite
Claim on Claim Indefiniteness: An Empirical Study of Definiteness Cases of the Past
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claims governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012).159 Both of these rules
had the effect of making it easier for a patent holder to obtain and
enforce broad, vague patent claims.160 And once a patent holder has
obtained a low-quality patent, the Federal Circuit has made it easier to
bring nuisance suits, patent-troll suits, and end-user suits. The court has
refused, for instance, to entertain appeals of claim-construction rulings
before cases have made it to final judgment, which makes it almost
impossible to avoid expansive discovery over infringement, validity,
and damages issues except by settling.161 Yet at the same time, the court
reviews almost all claim-construction decisions de novo and reverses
district courts’ constructions in a large percentage of cases; this renders
cases more uncertain and increases litigation costs and plaintiffs’ ability
to apply settlement pressure.162
Certain district courts have followed the Federal Circuit’s lead and
have made life easier for patent plaintiffs—most notoriously the Eastern
District of Texas, but including others as well.163 There are various
Decade with a Focus on the Federal Circuit and the Insolubly Ambiguous Standard, 10
CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 25, 30–34 (2010).
159. From 2004 to 2015, the Federal Circuit enforced a “strong” presumption
that claim language not using the word “means” should not be construed as means-plusfunction claim governed by § 112(f). See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d
1339, 1347–49 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (holding that the test for whether a claim
term is interpreted as a means-plus-function term is “whether the words of the claim are
understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning
as the name for structure”).
160. These are far from the only Federal Circuit doctrines that have affected
patent quality; they are just two especially clear examples. See also Masur, supra note
144; Wasserman, supra note 144.
161. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en
banc); Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent
Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 33–38 (2001); Edward Reines & Nathan Greenblatt,
Interlocutory Appeals of Claim Construction in the Patent Reform Act of 2009, 2009
PATENTLY-O PAT. L.J. 1.
162. Before Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015), the
Federal Circuit reviewed claim constructions de novo. Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1454
(en banc). Since Teva, claim constructions that depend on factual findings about
extrinsic evidence are reviewed deferentially, but since most claim constructions are
based only on intrinsic evidence, most reviews remain de novo.
163. See, e.g., J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U.
PA. L. REV. 631, 632–34 (2015); Daniel M. Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling,
89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 241–45 (2016); Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your Patent
Case, 38 AIPLA Q. J. 1, 4–5, 11 (2010); 441: When Patents Attack!, THIS AM. LIFE
(July 22, 2011), https://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/441/whenpatents-attack [https://perma.cc/4M57-X4BW] (“Why would a company rent an office
in a tiny town in East Texas, put a nameplate on the door, and leave it completely
empty for a year? The answer involves a controversial billionaire physicist in Seattle, a
40 pound cookbook, and a war waging right now, all across the software and tech
industries.”); 496: When Patents Attack . . . Part Two, THIS AM. LIFE (May 31, 2013),
https://www.thisamericanlife.org/ radio-archives/episode/496/when-patents-attack-part-
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reasons a patent holder might prefer one district to another:
convenience, speed, low cost, ability to exercise personal jurisdiction
over the defendant, willingness to allow cases to go to trial, or friendly
juries, for instance. Most of these reasons are benign, but two potential
reasons are especially problematic, one substantive and one procedural.
The substantive problem is that plaintiff-friendly districts might be
more inclined to rule in favor of patent holders—that is, those districts
might be biased in favor of patent holders—at least compared to the
baseline of other district courts. This can happen in several ways:
favorable claim constructions, grants or denials of summary judgment,
discovery rulings, and rulings on motions to admit or exclude evidence.
If one court is more favorable to plaintiffs than another, of course, it
does not follow that the first court is the one that’s wrong. But if the
substantive critiques of the patent system are correct, and patent quality
is a significant problem, then we should be more skeptical of courts that
are predisposed to rule in favor of patent holders. There is, however,
little evidence that district courts preferred by patent holders are
substantively biased in their favor.164
The procedural problem is that even if a plaintiff-friendly district
does nothing troubling on the merits, it can adopt rules and make
procedural rulings that enhance the plaintiff’s merits position or ability
to extract settlements. Again, this can happen in innumerable ways: a
court can order aggressive timetables for discovery or mandatory
disclosures (e.g., of a defendant’s invalidity arguments); it can
sequence litigation steps to drive up costs; it can decline to certify
questions for interlocutory review; it can send more cases to trial or
allow for longer trials. Many of these decisions are the sort of
procedural decision over which district judges have nearly unbounded
discretion, and individually they have relatively little importance. But in
the aggregate they can have a significant effect.
And though there is little evidence of substantive bias, there are
numerous examples of district courts adopting procedural rules that
give plaintiffs advantages. For instance, one of the Eastern District of
Texas’s key procedural innovations in attracting patent cases was a
local rule, applicable only to patent cases, that required defendants to

two [https://perma.cc/9985-UD5G] (“Two years ago, we did a program about a
mysterious business in Texas that threatens companies with lawsuits for violating its
patents. But the world of patent lawsuits is so secretive, there were basic questions we
could not answer. Now we can. And we get a glimpse why people say our patent
system may be discouraging, not encouraging, innovation.”).
164. Two coauthors and I will explore this question further in future work,
tentatively titled Does Venue Shopping Work? Some Evidence from Patent Appeals.
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serve invalidity contentions far earlier than in other district courts.165
This made it harder for defendants to defend against infringement
claims without investing substantial expert and attorney work into
developing invalidity arguments early in the case, increasing the
incentive to settle early, and thus the sums plaintiffs could demand in
settlement. Another key innovation in the district was a model order,
adopted by two judges of the court, that dispenses with the general
procedure for serving document requests and instead requires parties to
“produce or permit the inspection of all documents, electronically
stored information, and tangible things in the possession, custody, or
control of the party that are relevant to the pleaded claims or defenses
involved in this action.”166 This imposes an enormous discovery burden
on defendants, but often requires nonpracticing plaintiffs to do little.
Not all plaintiff-friendly procedures are inherently troubling, even if
one thinks the patent system is otherwise flawed in favor of patent
holders; speed and low costs have inherent virtues of their own. But
procedures that effectively reduce costs for patent holders, and increase
them for defendants, are another story.
To be sure, the Supreme Court has taken an increased interest in
patent cases in the last decade, which has effectively countered some of
the Federal Circuit’s more pro-patent holdings.167 Likewise, the Federal
Circuit has responded to some of the Eastern District of Texas’s
abuses, most notably by reigning in its refusal to transfer cases to other
districts.168 But both courts have chafed under supervision. The Federal
Circuit is notorious for resisting Supreme Court guidance.169 And in
165. See Anderson, supra note 153, at 652 & n.11; Alisha Kay Taylor, What
Does Forum Shopping in the Eastern District of Texas Mean for Patent Reform?, 6 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 570, 572–73 (2007).
166. Sample Discovery Order for Patent Cases Assigned to Judge Rodney
Gilstrap & Judge Roy Payne, U.S. DIST. CT.: E. DIST. TEX.,
http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/page1.shtml?location=info:judge&judge=12
[https://perma.cc/8KGS-EAKW] (last visited Mar. 31, 2017).
167. Since 2005, the Supreme Court has decided more than thirty patent cases,
usually reversing or vacating the Federal Circuit. See, e.g., Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse
Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1931 (2016); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 843;
Limelight Networks v. Akamai Techs., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2120 (2014); Nautilus, Inc. v.
Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2131 (2014); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology
v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2114, 2120 (2013); Mayo Collaborative
Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 92 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S.
593, 612–13 (2010); Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elec., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 638
(2008); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427–28 (2007); Microsoft Corp.
v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 458–59 (2007); eBay Inc. v. Mercexchange, LLC, 547
U.S. 388, 394 (2006).
168. E.g., In re Nintendo of Am., Inc., 756 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2014); In re
Toyota Motor Corp., 747 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2014); In re Google Inc., 588 F. App’x
988 (Fed. Cir. 2014); In re TOA Techs., Inc., 543 F. App’x 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
169. See supra note 155.
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one of the most striking moves yet by the Eastern District of Texas,
two judges of that court published sample docket-control orders170 for
use in patent cases that require defendants to seek permission, or wait
until after claim construction, to file a motion to dismiss under Alice
Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l.171 That case tightened the rules governing
patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012), casting doubt
on most software and business-method patents. And since Alice, courts
have invalidated many such patents on motions to dismiss;172 this made
it far harder to rely on those patents to bring nuisance, patent-troll, or
end-user cases, since the threat of expensive discovery is reduced. The
Eastern District of Texas eventually backed off its approach in the face
of public criticism.173 But the approach indicates the efforts to which
courts may be willing to go to resist patent reforms.
3. THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH: CONGRESS AND PATENT REFORM
Many of the problems discussed above could be addressed by
Congress; indeed, several patent reform bills have been introduced in
recent years, and one of them, the America Invents Act, was enacted in
2011.174 The interest-group dynamics of patent reform, however, has
combined with Congress’s institutional inertia to kill most reform
proposals and to water down the one bill that was enacted.
All of the critiques highlighted above are amenable to statutory
reform, to greater or lesser extents. Numerous statutory means have
been proposed to improve the quality of patent examination, though it is
170. Sample Docket Control Order for Patent Cases Assigned to Judge Rodney
Gilstrap & Judge Roy Payne, U.S. DIST. CT.: E. DIST. TEX.,
http://www.txed.uscourts.
gov/page1.shtml?location=info:judge&judge=12
[https://perma.cc/8KGS-EAKW] (last visited Mar. 31, 2017); see also Joe Mullin, East
Texas Judge’s Invention: A Method for Hampering Patent Defendants, ARS TECHNICA
(June 11, 2015, 3:57 PM) https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/06/east-texasjudges-invention-a-method-for-hampering-patent-defendants/ [https://perma.cc/E6T4ASQV]; Vera Ranieri, Judges in Texas Unfairly Impose New Requirements on Patent
Defendants,
ELEC.
FRONTIER
FOUND.
(June
10,
2015),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/06/judges-texas-unfairly-impose-new-requirementspatent-defendants [https://perma.cc/J2MD-S4CR]; Vera Ranieri, With Kafkaesque
Flourish, the Eastern District of Texas Penalizes Parties for Following the Rules,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 26, 2015), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/
2015/08/kafkaesque-flourish-eastern-district-texas-penalizes-parties-following-rules
[https://perma.cc/5LDC-ZV36].
171. 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
172. See Wilburn et al., supra note 103.
173.
Kevin Penton, Judge Gilstrap Rewrites Rules for Alice Motions in Texas,
LAW360 (Nov. 12, 2015, 4:31 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/726270/judgegilstrap-rewrites-rules-for-alice-motions-in-texas [https://perma.cc/745J-PCV6].
174. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284
(2011).
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likely that these proposals could only do so much.175 Litigation reforms
are more promising, since Congress has several policy levers that could
be manipulated, including the rules of evidence and procedure and the
fee-shifting rules.176 Indeed, one simple reform, awarding attorney fees
to prevailing parties in patent cases, would almost singlehandedly gut
the implicit threat of expensive litigation costs that drives nuisance
settlements. (Though it would concededly have other effects, some
difficult to predict.)
The America Invents Act shows just how difficult it is to enact
these sorts of reforms. The law was enacted in 2011177 after many years
of complaints about the patent system, but wound up doing very little
about those complaints. Of the law’s two most important changes, only
one had anything to do with patent quality or litigation abuse. That set
of provisions provided new ways for the Patent and Trademark Office
to revoke patents when it concludes that they were erroneously granted,
but did nothing ex ante to change the Office’s error rate, or to address
litigation abuse. And the other important change, a rewrite of patent
law’s priority rules and switch from a first-to-invent system to a firstinventor-to-file system, brings United States patent law into agreement
with foreign patent systems, but does nothing to address flaws with
patent quality or litigation abuses.178
The Act’s reforms were far narrower than many that Congress
considered in the years prior to the law’s enactment, thanks in large
part to lobbying against those proposals. The debate over patent reform
has largely turned into a battle between the technology and
pharmaceutical industries. Companies that make computer hardware,
telecommunications products, and especially software and online
services have mostly supported patent-reform efforts, both because they
are common targets of infringement suits and because their businesses

175. Patent examination may just be inherently difficult, so that error rates will
always be significant: patent applications by their nature deal in the cutting edge,
applicants will necessarily know more about their inventions than will examiners, and
the universe of potentially relevant prior art is so vast that examiners may reasonably
not be expected to uncover everything relevant. Moreover, even if errors could be
eliminated, it would likely be cost-inefficient to do so. See Lemley, supra note 105.
Indeed, the patent system has shown a surprising resilience to change. See Mark A.
Lemley, The Surprising Resilience of the Patent System (Stanford Pub. Law, Working
Paper No. 2784456), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2784456 [https://perma.cc/5KNLBC9J].
176. See generally Ford, supra note 101 (arguing that, because of a vicious
cycle in the patent system, litigation reforms could have a beneficial effect on patent
quality).
177. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 18.
178. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
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often do not depend on patent rights.179 (Many of the exceptions come
from a set of companies, like Kodak, Texas Instruments, and Micron
Technology, that have monetized their patent portfolios as other
revenue streams have declined.) The pharmaceutical industry, on the
other hand, both is heavily dependent on patent rights and is relatively
immune to patent trolls and nuisance suits. It has thus fought several
reform bills, arguing that they would impose new burdens on all patent
holders instead of targeting the most problematic lawsuits.180 For
instance, the pharmaceutical industry has pointed to unexpected uses of
the new inter partes review procedure as showing the risks of broad
patent reform. Using that procedure, hedge funds have challenged
pharmaceutical patents and shorted stocks of their owners, hoping to
profit when share prices fall.181 Pharmaceutical lobbyists have insisted
that their patents be exempt from inter partes review or that the system
be significantly weakened.182
The wild card for patent-reform efforts is that other interest and
industry groups have started getting involved, including groups that
have little to do with technology or traditional patent matters. For
instance, the National Association of Realtors—the nation’s secondmost-active lobbying group, but one that normally sticks to housing and
financial issues—has supported patent-reform bills after seeing
members become ensnared in the scanner cases.183 Similarly, the
National Retail Federation has taken up the issue after seeing member
retailers targeted by patent trolls; one lobbyist for the group said that

179. They’ve also been joined by low-tech companies that use commodity
technology products. See, e.g., Mario Trujillo, Tech Companies Join Retailers in
Patent
Push,
HILL
(Jan.
15,
2015,
9:57
AM),
http://thehill.com/policy/technology/229596-tech-companies-team-with-retailers-onpatent-reform [https://perma.cc/L9FF-UJZZ].
180. E.g., Robert Zirkelbach, What They Are Saying: Stakeholders Raise
Concerns about Patent Reform, PHRMA: PHARM. RES. & MFRS. AM. (Apr. 24, 2015),
http://catalyst.phrma.org/what-they-are-saying-stakeholders-raise-concerns-aboutpatent-litigation-reform [https://perma.cc/7M66-C7FA].
181. Joseph Walker & Rob Copeland, New Hedge Fund Strategy: Dispute the
Patent, Short the Stock, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 7, 2015, 7:24 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/hedge-fund-manager-kyle-bass-challenges-jazz-pharmaceuticals-patent1428417408 [https://perma.cc/7ZFN-49BR].
182. E.g., Press Release, Biotechnology Innovation Org., BIO Opposes H.R.
9, the Innovation Act (June 11, 2015), https://www.bio.org/media/press-release/bioopposes-hr-9-innovation-act [https://perma.cc/6VJB-2KPG].
183. E.g., Kate Ackley, K Street Files: Realtors Rack Up Record Lobby Tab,
ROLL CALL (Jan. 27, 2015, 1:02 PM), http://blogs.rollcall.com/beltway-insiders/kstreet-files-national-association-of-realtors/
[https://perma.cc/DMH8-3JS6];
Press
Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, Senate Patent Reform Bill a Good First Step, Say
Realtors (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.realtor.org/news-releases/2015/04/senate-patentreform-bill-a-good-first-step-say-realtors [https://perma.cc/D6ZB-A44L].
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patent lawsuits have “gone from a nuisance to a real issue.”184 As more
interest groups are adversely affected by the problems in the patent
system discussed above, and are affected enough to focus lobbying
efforts on the problem, the coalition that supports strong reforms should
get larger and the likelihood of some reform bill passing should
increase.
B. State Institutions and Patent Federalism
State anti-patent laws would serve no purpose if they were as
difficult to enact as meaningful federal reforms. But thanks to a
veritable perfect storm of factors, led by favorable legislative
environments in many states, state efforts to change the patent system
have expanded rapidly. Public-choice theory helps explain the rapid
expansion of state anti-patent laws.185 Two of public-choice theory’s
basic observations have been especially important to the rise of patent
federalism: the importance of interest groups and of agenda-setting
institutions to the legislative process. Moreover, the laws have been
structured in a way to limit opposition from opposing interest groups,
leading to legislative debates that have been strikingly one-sided.
1. INTEREST-GROUP SUPPORT
Interest groups and the structure of interest-group influence in
statehouses have played important roles in getting state anti-patent laws
passed. Legislatures are more likely to enact policies that provide
benefits to concentrated interest groups than to enact policies with more
broadly dispersed benefits.186 This is so because it is easier for smaller
184. Andria Cheng, Why Retailers Became a Top Target of Patent Trolls,
MARKETWATCH (July 25, 2014, 11:23 AM), http://blogs.marketwatch.com/
behindthestorefront/2014/07/25/why-retailers-became-a-top-target-of-patent-trolls/
[https://perma.cc/PED6-2MG8] (observing that in the first half of 2014, 136 retailers
were sued in 264 patent cases brought by nonpracticing entities); see also Press
Release, Nat’l Retail Fed’n, Nat’l Retail Fed’n Forms Patent Reform Coalition (Jan.
15, 2015), https://nrf.com/media/press-releases/national-retail-federation-forms-patentreform-coalition [https://perma.cc/VWP8-Q7L3].
185.
See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC
CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 1 (1991) (“Public choice theory is a hybrid: the
application of the economist’s methods to the political scientist’s subject.”); Tom
Ginsburg, Ways of Criticizing Public Choice: The Uses of Empiricism and Theory in
Legal Scholarship, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1139, 1140–41 (observing that public choice is
less a theory than a collection of related observations).
186. See generally, e.g., DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 472–500
(2003); Farber & Frickey, supra note 185, at 12–37. This is sometimes regarded as the
Chicago School branch of public-choice theory. E.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P.
Frickey, Public Choice Revisited, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1715, 1717 (1998). This is not to
say, of course, that interest groups are the only things that matter, or that legislators do
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groups to organize and influence legislators than it is for the general
public, and because groups are more likely to organize in support of
policies that provide them the greatest benefits.187 This dynamic has
played out in the states: legislatures have been receptive to anti-patent
laws in significant part because groups that would benefit from those
laws are (relatively) small and concentrated, and have preexisting
channels of influence in statehouses, while groups that would suffer
from them are (relatively) dispersed and have little preexisting influence
over state legislators.
The main interest groups driving the adoption of state anti-patent
laws have been trade associations representing local businesses and
nonprofits targeted by patent trolls sending demand letters.188 The
importance of these interest groups is shown in the legislative history of
these laws, at least in the (few) states that make detailed legislative
history easily available.189 For instance, in Wisconsin, five local
business groups and two local companies lobbied in support of the antipatent bill that eventually became law.190 Those groups are longtime
players in Wisconsin politics and include the state’s most influential
business and banking groups.191 Similarly, representatives of the
not respond to constituent needs or vote in favor of their own policy preferences;
rather, all else being equal, the support of an influential interest group matters. See
FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 185, at 21–33 (summarizing the empirical evidence).
187. E.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent
Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975) (“The
price that the winning [interest] group bids [for favorable legislation] is determined both
by the value of legislative protection to the group’s members and the group’s ability to
overcome the free-rider problems that plague coalitions.”).
188. Gugliuzza, supra note 44, at 1590–91 (“Vermont’s statute seems, by all
accounts, to have been the product of a grassroots effort by businesses and nonprofits in
the state who had received demand letters from bottom feeders such as MPHJ.”).
189. I am indebted to Paul Gugliuzza and Dan Risica for sharing their research
on the legislative histories of state anti-patent laws.
190. The business groups were the Alliance of Wisconsin Retailers, the
Wisconsin Bankers Association, the Wisconsin Grocers Association, the Wisconsin
Hotel and Lodging Association, and Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce. The
companies were Northeast Communications of Wisconsin, Inc. and Quad/Graphics,
Inc., a large public company that is based in Wisconsin. See Our Journey to Transform
Quad: 2014 Shareholders Letter and Annual Report on Form 10-K, QUAD/GRAPHICS,
INC. (Dec. 31, 2014), http://investors.qg.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=231687&p=irolreportsannual [https://perma.cc/PNL7-GS5V]; Wis. Ethics Comm’n, 2013–2014
Legislative
Session:
Senate
Bill
498,
EYE
ON
LOBBYING,
https://lobbying.wi.gov/What/BillInformation/
2013REG/Information/10968?tab=Efforts [https://perma.cc/T6ZQ-8ZZE] (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
191. E.g., Jeff Mayers, State Recycling Bill Passes, WIS. ST. J., Mar. 21,
1990, at 1A (calling Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce “the state’s most
influential business group”); Karen Rivedal, WMC Names Leader to Replace Haney,
WIS. ST. J., Mar. 4, 2011, at B8 (calling the Wisconsin Bankers Association “the
state’s largest financial industry trade group” and Wisconsin Manufacturers and
Commerce “the state’s most influential business and industrial lobby”).
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Midwest chapter of the Printing Industries of America and the
Nebraska Bankers Association testified in support of an anti-patent bill
that eventually became law in that state, as did the Oregon Home
Builders Association in writing in that state.192 The Oregon association
pointed to demand letters its member companies had received,
discussing a newly issued patent that allegedly “covers certain moisture
removal processes that you are presently using, or may use in the
future, in your construction business;” the association called the letters
“precisely the sort of shakedown that [the bill] is designed to
prevent.”193
The bills were not without opponents. In Wisconsin, for instance,
representatives of the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation and the
biotechnology industry group BioForward testified against the bill, and
two multinational pharmaceutical companies, AstraZeneca and Johnson
& Johnson, lobbied against the bill.194 But many more large companies
and trade associations—including several that rely on patent rights, like
3M, GlaxoSmithKline, Microsoft, and PhRMA—lobbied without
opposing the bill, likely to help shape its terms so they would apply to
fewer patent assertions.195 Indeed, as discussed below, the laws are
structured such that they largely affect only the most problematic patent
assertions and leave most patent assertions unscathed, likely thanks in
part to this sort of lobbying.196
Even with mixed support for these bills, the balance of interestgroup support tilted in favor of enacting the bills. Although there has
been some overlap, in general local businesses and groups have been
more likely to support anti-patent bills, while national businesses and
groups have been more likely to oppose them. This asymmetry arises
because the rights conveyed by the patent system are national in scope;
national businesses, then, should be more likely to rely on patent rights,
since local patent holders leave markets on the table and would be
amortizing the fixed costs of obtaining patent rights across a smaller

192. Hearing on LB677 Before S. Judiciary Comm., 2014 Leg., 103rd Sess.
17–24
(Neb.
2014)
[hereinafter
Hearing
on
LB677],
http://www.nebraskalegislature.gov/ FloorDocs/103/PDF/Transcripts/Judiciary/2014-0205.pdf [https://perma.cc/JVL2-VL2F]; Letter from Jon Chandler, Or. Home Builders
Ass’n, to Senate Comm. on Judiciary (Feb. 12, 2014).
193. Letter from Jon Chandler, supra note 192.
194. Hearing on S.B. 498 Before the Wis. S. Comm. on Gov’t Operations,
Pub. Works, and Telecomms., 2013–14 Leg. (Wis. 2014) [hereinafter Hearing on S.B.
498],
http://www.wiseye.org/Programming/VideoArchive/EventDetail.aspx?evhdid=8494 [https://perma.cc/8PJU-E8L2]; Wis. Ethics Comm’n, supra note 190.
195. Wis. Ethics Comm’n, supra note 190.
196. See infra Part IV.B.3.
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market.197 But local businesses are also more likely to succeed in
lobbying state legislatures, since they are more likely to have
preexisting channels of influence in statehouses. Both national and local
businesses are affected by state laws, but local law is relatively more
important to local businesses; for national businesses, a single state’s
law usually constrains only a small percentage of the business’s
operations.
Local business support for anti-patent bills is also likely to be more
intense than national opposition, because the benefits such bills offer to
local businesses are likely to be greater than the costs to national
businesses. This is so because businesses that do not rely on patent
rights can only benefit from laws that make it harder to enforce patent
rights, while businesses that rely on patent rights can benefit or suffer
under such laws, since they can be both plaintiffs and defendants in
patent cases. This especially describes the status quo for many
electronics companies, since they both frequently patent their own
inventions and frequently get sued for infringing others’ patents. This
explains why many businesses did not lobby for or against the laws, but
instead sought modifications of draft bills.
These effects are all felt on the margins, of course; there are many
local businesses that rely on patent rights or lack ties to statehouses,
just as there are many national businesses that do not rely on patent
rights or that have state lobbying operations. And there are other
reasons states have enacted anti-patent laws, including the widespread
feeling that the patent system needs reform. But the relative strength of
interest groups does help explain why so many states have so quickly
enacted anti-patent laws, in contrast with Congress’s failure to enact
meaningful patent reform.
2. AGENDA-SETTING INSTITUTIONS
Public-choice theory also suggests that legislative outcomes can be
unpredictable because there is usually no equilibrium policy outcome
that is preferable to every other outcome, and therefore that agenda
setters198 often have broad powers to shape policy outcomes.199

197. These costs average about $20,000 to $30,000 per patent, see supra note
105, which are relatively small in the grand scheme of things to a large national
business, but become more significant the smaller a business is.
198.
This Article uses the term “agenda setter” in a broad sense, to refer to
decision makers who determine or influence which policy proposals are considered and
voted on by legislatures, not just the individual (usually a committee chair or legislative
leader) who decides what proposals get votes and in what order. Using this definition,
some of the formal findings of public-choice theory about agenda setting may not apply.
But the general observation that legislative outcomes are often indeterminate and that
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Legislative leaders are the most traditional form of agenda setters, but
there are numerous other means by which individuals and groups can
shape the policy choices that legislators consider. Indeed, interest
groups are, in a sense, just a specific case of the general category of
agenda setter. Besides interest groups, three other forms of agenda
setting have played important roles in the enactment of state anti-patent
laws.
First, state attorneys general have played important roles in
drawing legislators’ attention to the problems that state anti-patent laws
are designed to address. In some cases, they did so after using, or
attempting to use, existing provisions of state law to go after patent
trolls; for instance, the Vermont, Nebraska, and Minnesota attorneys
general all sued or sent cease-and-desist letters to MPHJ.200 After
Nebraska’s attorney general was slapped down by a federal court that
held that the office had exceeded its authority in sending a cease-anddesist letter,201 the office worked with a state senator to draft
Nebraska’s bill and testified in its support.202 Similarly, the legislative
director of the Oregon Department of Justice testified that a law was
needed because the Oregon Unlawful Trade Practices Act “does not
specifically address conduct arising from demands based upon patent
rights” and because that law’s “more general provisions may not have
application as demands or allegations of patent infringement are often
directed towards businesses,” not consumers.203 Without state attorneys
general identifying the problem, drafting legislative language, and
advocating for passage, it is likely that few or no states would have
enacted anti-patent laws.
Second, states have acted as de facto agenda setters for other
states, since once one state has drafted legislation to address a widely
agenda setters have substantial power to shape those outcomes holds even for this broad
conception of agenda setting.
199. See generally, e.g., FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 185, at 38–62. This
finding stems from Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theorem, which shows that there is
no generally applicable voting mechanism that optimizes social welfare while satisfying
three basic fairness criteria. Id. 38–39. But the importance of agenda setters also stems
from two other constraints seen in the legislative process. One is that the legislative
process imposes costs just like any other transaction; legislators have limited capacity to
consider proposals. This gives agenda setters the ability to direct that limited attention
to particular policy choices and questions. The other is that legislators are subject to the
same cognitive biases and failures as others, including tendencies to be overly
optimistic or risk averse. Agenda setters can capitalize on these biases, for instance by
pointing to other states to induce herd behavior.
200. See supra note 11.
201. Activision TV, Inc. v. Pinnacle Bancorp, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 2d 1157,
1160–61 (D. Neb. 2013).
202. Hearing on LB677, supra note 192, at 4.
203. Letter from Aaron Knott, Legislative Dir., to Floyd Prozanski, Chair
Senate Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 11, 2014).
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acknowledged problem, other states are free to borrow that language.
In Nebraska, for instance, an assistant attorney general testified that
“[t]he vast majority of [the Nebraska bill was] patterned off of the
Vermont statute.”204 A senator later asked: “Are you very comfortable
with this language that you copied from Vermont? Are you satisfied
that they had very competent legal minds, that this language is carefully
crafted and the bill is tightly drafted? That’s your feeling about this?”205
The assistant attorney general responded “I am, Senator. Yes,” which
was apparently sufficient assurance.206 Legislators are risk-averse, so
reassurance that other states have taken the same action, with no
obvious downsides presenting themselves, may help explain the rapid
expansion of these laws.
Third, the Council of State Governments, an influential
organization that advises and lobbies on behalf of state governments,
has acted as an agenda setter by including recommended language
based on Vermont’s law in its latest round of suggested state
legislation.207 Recommendations of the Council often spread to many
states; indeed, a common pattern is for one state to enact legislation to
address a common issue, and for other states to then follow suit on the
Council’s recommendation.208 Though the Council’s recommendation is
new, this pattern has begun playing out in the patent context: one of the
latest states to enact an anti-patent law, Florida, specifically cited the
recommendation in a bill analysis.209
Agenda setters have limited power; they cannot force legislatures
to enact laws that do not have the support of enough legislators.210 But
the universe of bills that might attract enough support to pass a
legislature is large, and recipients of demand letters and other agenda

204. Hearing on LB677, supra note 192, at 13.
205. Id. at 15.
206. Id.
207. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 27–29
(2015), http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/system/files/SSL%202015%20Final%20with
%20Cover.pdf [https://perma.cc/CEK2-ZNL8]; see also Elizabeth Garrett, Framework
Legislation and Federalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 1506–07 (2008);
Gugliuzza, supra note 44, at 1593.
208. See Heather L. Foss, Torts—Municipal Corporations: Immunity for
Injuries Suffered on any Municipalities’ Public Land Allowed by the North Dakota
Supreme Court, 79 N.D. L. REV. 529, 532–33 (2003).
209. STAFF OF COMM. ON JUDICIARY, BILL ANALYSIS AND FISCAL IMPACT
STATEMENT ON SB 1084 at 2 (Mar. 30, 2015), https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/
2015/1084/Analyses/2015s1084.pre.ju.PDF [https://perma.cc/MD77-APNT].
210. Though the most powerful agenda setters, those with the ability to
unilaterally choose which options to put up to a vote, can in some circumstances cause
legislators to vote for outcomes they would not prefer to other available options. See
FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 185, at 38–42.
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setters have played a key role in drawing legislator attention to the
patent issue.
3. POLICY DESIGN AND SELECTION EFFECTS
State anti-patent laws have been designed to apply to the most
troublesome patent assertions, and to avoid the most common ones,
minimizing interest-group opposition in state legislatures. Coupled with
the interest-group and agenda-setter support discussed above, this
relatively muted opposition has made it easier for state legislatures to
enact anti-patent laws.
By targeting demand letters and inflated threats to sue rather than
lawsuits themselves, state anti-patent laws have their greatest effects on
nuisance suits, end-user suits, and other suits with low likelihoods of
success. Patent holders bringing these kinds of cases will necessarily
have a harder time satisfying detailed demand-letter or pre-investigation
requirements, either because the merits of their claims cannot live up to
those requirements or because the economics do not support it. But
patent holders that do not rely on those categories of lawsuits can
relatively easily comply with the requirements and so face
comparatively smaller obstacles to bringing patent lawsuits.
The businesses that would be the most effective opponents of state
anti-patent laws—businesses that have much at stake because they
depend on patent rights, with experience lobbying state legislatures—do
not rely on the kinds of patent lawsuits that the state laws target. There
are two reasons for this. First, the merits of their claims are often
stronger. Businesses depend on patent rights because they give them
monopolies over valuable technologies, and those monopolies can be
worth millions or billions of dollars. But extracting that value requires
being able to successfully enforce those rights, or competitors will not
be deterred from entering the market, denying patent holders those
monopoly profits. A patent holder with a meritorious claim—or even
one that is reasonably likely to succeed—will have no trouble satisfying
the demands of state laws targeting “bad faith” infringement claims.
And second, this kind of patent holder rarely targets small defendants,
whether small businesses or end users.211 Instead, they target
businesses—often competitors—selling products and services that
allegedly infringe the patent.212 There are rarely more than a few dozen
such companies, though, so the incremental cost of complying with
state laws is small.213 Since these patent holders do not need to rely on
sending hundreds or thousands of demand letters, they can take on the
211.
212.
213.

See Gugliuzza, supra note 44, at 1581.
Id.
Id. at 1582–83.

2017:551

The Uneasy Case for Patent Federalism

603

incremental cost of identifying, with specificity, how defendants
allegedly infringe their patents.
Interest-group advocacy in the states has reflected the limited
stakes of anti-patent laws for businesses that rely on patent rights. In
Wisconsin, for instance, the only industry opposition to the bill was
from BioForward, a Wisconsin biotechnology industry group.214 But
BioForward’s testimony acknowledged that patent trolls and patent
holders sending thousands of demand letters were significant problems
and that large companies relying on patent rights could and should
comply with reasonable specificity requirements for demand letters.215
Its principal contentions were that enacting a patchwork of different
state requirements could have unintended consequences and that
Congress was considering similar proposals, which would address the
problem without state intervention and possible preemption.216 And as
observed above, other industry groups and companies relying on patent
rights focused their attention on tweaking the bill instead of opposing it
outright, helping ensure that the bill would be narrowly tailored.
Because concentrated interest groups with preexisting channels of
influence in statehouses supported anti-patent laws and agenda setters
helped push those laws along while opposition was muted at best, states
have been able to act when the federal government has not. And
because the state laws help address genuine problems in the federal
patent system, they may end up doing more good than harm.
V.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FEDERAL PATENT SYSTEM AND
PATENT REFORM

This assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of state antipatent laws has important implications for ongoing debates about patent
federalism and the patent system as a whole.
A. Reassessing the Normative Case Against Patent Federalism
The normative case against patent federalism described earlier in
this article rests on three problems with giving states more control over
patent law: that it could upset the balance between innovation and
competition, could increase compliance costs, and could encourage rent
seeking by states that disproportionately produce or consume
innovation.217 The analysis in this article, however, suggests that these
problems may be exaggerated.
214.
215.
216.
217.
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First, though it is undoubtedly the case that state laws alter the
patent system’s balance between innovation and competition—that’s
why states have passed them in the first place—that may not be a bad
thing. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the careful
balance patent law strikes between these competing goals, but the
institutional analysis above suggests that there are strong reasons to
doubt that the correct balance has been struck.218 Moreover, the state
laws are relatively narrowly targeted, disproportionately affecting lowquality patents and nuisance and end-user litigation.219 Since these are
portions of the patent system that, most agree, are especially
problematic, it is relatively straightforward to conclude that the state
laws might tweak the balance between innovation and competition in
helpful ways. It is not as if the laws purport to undertake broader
adjustments, like changing the length of the patent term or the standards
for what is patentable.
Second, though markedly diverse state patent laws would
substantially increase patent holders’ compliance costs, there is no
evidence of this happening in any widespread way under the state antipatent laws. Partly this is because the state laws are mostly consistent
with one another, so the burden has not been greatly multiplied; as long
as patent holders include basic information in each demand letter, such
as the name of the patent holder, the number of each asserted patent,
and a description of how the recipient allegedly infringes the patent,
and provides reasonable time to comply with demands, it is probably
okay under even the most stringent state law. It also stems from the
nature of the state laws, which principally target patent holders who
send many demand letters; these are the patent holders for whom the
compliance burden would be greatest, but that burden is the whole
point, since these are also the patent holders who most need to be
deterred. Multiple states converging onto one largely consistent body of
law is a common pattern in state lawmaking. And so just as the
Restatements reflect broad consensus in various areas of law, and just
as trade-secret law is largely consistent from state to state, a body of
largely consistent state-law limitations on patent holders may be the
result of these laws.
Third, though patent federalism could lead to rent seeking by states
that disproportionately produce or consume innovation, leading to
systematic distortions in the patent system, there is also no evidence of
this happening under the state laws that have been passed. One way
such rent seeking might show up would be if states that most rely on
patent rights were less likely to enact anti-patent laws. However, there
has been no correlation between how many patents a state obtains
218.
219.

See supra Part III.A.
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(either total or per capita) and whether it has enacted an anti-patent law;
states that have enacted laws come in all shapes and sizes, from some
of the ones that obtain the most patents to some of the ones that obtain
the fewest.220 Not all patents are equal, of course; it is possible that
some states produce more valuable patents, and that these states are less
likely to enact anti-patent laws. I have no reason to believe this is true,
though the assumption is ripe for further research and testing. It is also
possible, if states are the easier forum for obtaining favorable
legislation, that we may start to see interest groups more aggressively
targeting states.
All three of these conclusions are subject to an important caveat,
which is that the minimal downsides observed so far may be a result of
the limited scope of the anti-patent laws enacted to date. If states could
go farther in their efforts to change the patent system, then we might
see greater effects that could exacerbate some of these problems. If
states were free to change the patent system in broader or deeper ways,
then the effect on the balance between innovation and competition
would be more drastically affected; likewise, the burden of complying
with multiple state laws would be a larger problem. If, for instance,
each state had the power to grant its own patents,221 then the cost of
protecting an invention could be much higher than it is under the single
federal system. Likewise, we might see more efforts to benefit homestate businesses, whether they rely on patent rights or are burdened by
them, if the effects were greater. This suggests that the arguments
against patent federalism have greater or lesser salience depending on
the specific state laws at issue: the greater the effect a state law has on
the patent system, or the more it departs from the practice of other
states or the federal government, the greater the burden to show a need
for the law.

220. Specifically, logistic regressions with a dependent binary variable
representing whether a state has enacted an anti-patent law show no correlation with
independent variables representing the per-capita number of patents issued to applicants
from each state from 2000 to 2013 and the natural-log-adjusted gross numbers of
patents issued to applicants from each state in those years. (The gross numbers are logadjusted because the log-adjusted distribution much more closely approximates a
normal distribution, since the distribution of state populations is highly skewed.) For
the per-capita numbers, the logistic regression gives a beta value of −0.01765 and a
standard error of 0.10805, for p = 0.87024. For the log-adjusted gross numbers, the
logistic regression gives a beta value of −0.05333 and a standard error of 0.2056, for
p = 0.79533. (These statistics were calculated when twenty-seven states had enacted
anti-patent laws.)
221. See, e.g., Hrdy, supra note 17.
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B. Rethinking the Preemption Case Law

This assessment of patent federalism also has implications for the
Supreme Court’s and Federal Circuit’s respective analyses of patent
law’s preemptive effect.
Experience with state anti-patent laws suggests that the Supreme
Court’s preemption cases may be too quick to find state laws
preempted. Since, the Supreme Court has held, federal law does not
occupy the entire field of patent law, there is room for state laws to
have an effect on the patent system; only when a state law conflicts
with federal patent law or stands as an obstacle to the goals of federal
patent law is the state law preempted.222 The game, then, is in
determining when a state law stands as an obstacle to the goals of
federal law. And on that question, the Supreme Court has drawn a
demanding line: state laws are vulnerable whenever they act in a way
that might change patent law’s balance between innovation and
competition.223 But the analysis in this Article suggests that the Supreme
Court’s line may be too strict. The Court has repeatedly emphasized the
careful balance federal patent law strikes between competing objectives,
but the analysis in this article suggests that state tweaks to that balance
can further the system’s ultimate goal of encouraging both innovation
and competition.
Though it involved a state law providing additional patent-like
protections instead of a law limiting federal protections, the Court’s
Bonito Boats case is an instructive example of the aggressive nature of
its preemption doctrine.224 Although the Court found that Florida’s
protection for boat-hull designs upset federal patent law’s careful
balance of incentives, there are reasons to suggest that Florida had
identified a real problem.225 And Congress eventually agreed, passing
the Vessel Hull Design Protection Act nine years later as part of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act.226 The Supreme Court’s preemption
decision, then, protected a “careful balance” that turned out to be
anything but.227 In that particular case, Congress solved the problem,
222. See generally supra Part I.B.
223. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
224. Id.
225. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-436, at 12–13 (1998) (reporting that a
manufacturer may spend up to $500,000 designing the shape of a boat hull, while
copying an existing design is much cheaper—precisely the high-innovation-cost, lowcopying-cost scenario in which intellectual property makes economic sense).
226. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1332 (2012).
227. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 146 (“From their inception, the
federal patent laws have embodied a careful balance between the need to promote
innovation and the recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation are both
necessary to invention itself and the very lifeblood of a competitive economy.”).
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though only after a nine-year delay, and only because in the specific
instance of boat hulls, there was no significant interest group opposed
to the legislation. With broader problems like nuisance litigation and
patent trolls, of course, the public-choice obstacles to federal legislation
are much greater.
This experience with state anti-patent laws also suggests that the
Federal Circuit’s preemption cases may be too demanding. Those cases
permit state laws to survive preemption analysis only when they require
both objective and subjective bad faith on the part of patent holders, but
experience with the state laws shows that that requirement accounts for
a small fraction of troubling patent assertions. These requirements rule
out, for instance, any effort to regulate letters demanding excessive
royalties, or providing inadequate information about the asserted
patents, or giving inadequate time to respond, or falsely threatening
suit. But all these practices are troubling because they let patent holders
extract settlements that can bear little relation to the value of the
asserted patents. The state laws’ more-expansive view, which considers
numerous factors in concluding whether a patent holder has committed
“bad faith,” provides a better model for identifying these problematic
patent assertions.
C. Reconsidering Federal Patent Reform
State efforts to influence and change the patent system can also
provide both substantive and mechanistic insights that should inform
federal efforts to reform the patent system.
On the substantive side, state laws show the importance of
considering out-of-court behavior by patent holders. Most federal
reform efforts focus on improving patent quality or on reforming the
litigation system, but state laws have mostly taken another tack,
targeting pre-litigation behavior. To some degree, this was necessary,
since measures targeting pre-litigation behavior are less vulnerable to
preemption attacks. But the states also recognized a genuine problem
with information asymmetries that let unscrupulous patent holders
extract unmerited settlements. By making it harder for patent holders to
target end users, states can channel meritorious patent litigation into
cases against manufacturers and competitors, which are less socially
wasteful than end-user cases; by making it harder to bring nuisance
cases, states can channel unmeritorious litigation out of the system
entirely. And to the extent these measures are successful, they can
reduce the incentive to obtain low-quality patents, helping to address
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the patent-quality critique.228 These out-of-court measures, then, may be
an important component of effective patent reforms.
On the mechanistic side, however, this analysis shows that the
federal government may be ill-suited to adopt these reforms.
Policymakers and scholars have proposed that the federal government
should borrow ideas from states enacting anti-patent laws,229 but the
public-choice failures in Congress suggest that efforts to enact prelitigation reforms may be doomed to failure; just as the America
Invents Act was watered down by opposition from patent-dependent
interest groups, reforms that make it harder to enforce patent rights can
count on similar opposition. And even if reforms were enacted,
institutional failures in the federal courts suggest that those reforms
may be watered down. Because states are not subject to these
constraints, they may be more effective conduits for these reforms.
Indeed, there is a history of the federal government taking over
organic state-level reforms and effectively neutralizing them. For
instance, the CAN-SPAM Act, the federal law that regulates spam
email, was enacted in response to anti-spam laws enacted in many
states. The act adopted many of the provisions of those state laws,
banning forged email headers and deceptive subject lines and requiring
senders to include contact information and provide opt-out
mechanisms.230 But it was notably weaker in two ways than some of the
state laws: its enforcement mechanisms were far more limited, and it
failed to ban unsolicited commercial email outright, as two states had
done.231 A Senate committee report explained that a uniform national
standard was important because email is interstate in nature and because
an email address does not reveal the holder’s location, making it hard
to comply with different state laws.232 But the report also made clear
why spam would not be banned, distinguishing “fraud and deception in
e-mail” as “behavior that a legitimate business trying to comply with
relevant laws would not be engaging in anyway.”233 If Congress
concluded that non-fraudulent, but unsolicited, email was a tool that a
legitimate business might use, then state laws banning it would go too
far. State lawmakers were less likely to come to that conclusion for
228.
229.
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many of the same reasons state lawmakers are more likely to want to
limit patent enforcement: because businesses relying heavily on email
were more likely to be national or international in scale, while
individuals who would enjoy greater protections under state laws had
comparatively greater power at the statehouse level.
To be sure, state experiences with anti-patent laws can help inform
federal patent reform. But those experiences suggest that relying
exclusively on federal law to reform the patent system is unlikely to
work, and that states are well-positioned to play a helpful role.
CONCLUSION
After many decades of exclusive federal control over the patent
law, states have started asserting themselves in ways that may threaten
the uniform federal patent system. There are strong reasons to be
concerned about this development, since it threatens to increase costs
and reduce the incentives the patent system creates to develop
innovative new technologies. And yet, as this Article has pointed out,
there are also reasons to give this development a second glance. These
laws respond to real problems in the federal patent system, problems
which that system has been largely unable to address. And while the
states have their own problems, those problems happen to offset the
ones in the federal system. The result, then, may be a system that is
better than a purely federal system not in spite of, but because of, the
states’ flaws. State efforts to affect the patent system, then, may reflect
a second-best option for achieving effective patent reform.

